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Coercion, survival, and war : why weak states resist the United States / Phil Haun.

De Gruyter Stanford University Press Complete eBook-Package 2014-2015 Available online

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EBSCOhost Academic eBook Collection (North America) Available online

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Ebook Central Academic Complete Available online

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Ebook Central University Press Available online

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Ebscohost Ebooks University Press Collection (North America) Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Haun, Phil M., author.
Series:
Stanford security studies.
Stanford security studies
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Asymmetric warfare--United States--Case studies.
Asymmetric warfare.
Asymmetric warfare--Case studies.
United States--Military policy--Case studies.
United States.
United States--Foreign relations--Case studies.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (286 p.)
Edition:
1st ed.
Place of Publication:
Stanford, California : Stanford Security Studies, 2015.
Language Note:
English
System Details:
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Summary:
In asymmetric interstate conflicts, great powers have the capability to coerce weak states by threatening their survival—but not vice versa. It is therefore the great power that decides whether to escalate a conflict into a crisis by adopting a coercive strategy. In practice, however, the coercive strategies of the U.S. have frequently failed. In Coercion, Survival and War Phil Haun chronicles 30 asymmetric interstate crises involving the US from 1918 to 2003. The U.S. chose coercive strategies in 23 of these cases, but coercion failed half of the time: most often because the more powerful U.S. made demands that threatened the very survival of the weak state, causing it to resist as long as it had the means to do so. It is an unfortunate paradox Haun notes that, where the U.S. may prefer brute force to coercion, these power asymmetries may well lead it to first attempt coercive strategies that are expected to fail in order to justify the war it desires. He concludes that, when coercion is preferred to brute force there are clear limits as to what can be demanded. In such cases, he suggests, U.S. policymakers can improve the chances of success by matching appropriate threats to demands, by including other great powers in the coercive process, and by reducing a weak state leader's reputational costs by giving him or her face-saving options.
Contents:
Front matter
CONTENTS
List of Tables, Figures, and Maps
Acknowledgments
1. Introduction
2. A Theory of Asymmetric Interstate Coercion
3. Survival and Coercion Failure
4. The United States versus Iraq: The Gulf and Iraq Wars
5. The United States versus Serbia: Bosnia and Kosovo
6. The United States versus Libya: El Dorado Canyon, Pan Am Flight 103, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
7. Conclusion
Appendix A: Coding U.S. Cases of Asymmetric Coercion
Appendix B: Asymmetric Coercion Model
Notes
Index
Notes:
Includes index.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Description based on print version record.
ISBN:
9780804795074
080479507X
OCLC:
1178768980

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