Elements of Optimal Monetary Policy Committee Design / Jerome Vandenbussche.

Format:

Book

Government document

Author/Creator:

Vandenbussche, Jérôme.

Contributor:

International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department.

Series:

IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2006/277

IMF Working Papers

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Committees.

Monetary policy--Decision making.

Monetary policy.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (40 p.)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2006.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

The move from individual decision making to committee decision making is widely seen as a major evolution in contemporary central banking. This paper reviews the relevant economics and social psychology literatures with a view to providing some insights into the question of optimal monetary policy committee design. While the preference aggregation literature points to the effect of committee structure on the extent of the time inconsistency problem and its associated costs, the belief aggregation literature analyzes how different committee structures affect the efficiency of information pooling, the process of social influence, and collective accuracy. In conclusion, we highlight the main tradeoffs that the analysis has brought to light and point to directions for future research.

Contents:

""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. A LARGE DIVERSITY OF MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEES""; ""III. NORMATIVE ISSUES IN MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE DESIGN""; ""IV. PREFERENCE AGGREGATION IN MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEES""; ""V. BELIEF AGGREGATION IN MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEES""; ""VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS""; ""VII. REFERENCES""

Notes:

"December 2006."

Includes bibliographical references.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

9786613827470

9781462304387

1462304389

9781452717845

1452717842

9781283515023

1283515024

9781451909906

145190990X

OCLC:

694141213