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Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline? / Ashoka Mody, Stefania Fabrizio.
- Format:
- Book
- Government document
- Author/Creator:
- Mody, Ashoka.
- Series:
- IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2006/123
- IMF Working Papers
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Budget--European Union countries--Econometric models.
- Budget.
- Fiscal policy--European Union countries--Econometric models.
- Fiscal policy.
- Elections--Economic aspects--European Union countries.
- Elections.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (53 p.)
- Edition:
- 1st ed.
- Place of Publication:
- Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2006.
- Language Note:
- English
- Summary:
- The budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities. We confirm this proposition for a group of new and potential members of the European Union, finding that politics dominates. The contemporary practice of democracy can increase budget deficits through not only ideological preferences but also more fragmented government coalitions and higher voter participation. Long-term structural forces, triggered by societal divisions and representative electoral rules, have more ambiguous implications but also appear to increase budget pressures, as others have also found. However, our most robust, and hopeful, finding is that budget institutions-mechanisms and rules of the budget process-that create checks and balances have significant value even when the politics is representative but undisciplined, and when long-term structural forces are unfavorable.
- Contents:
- ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. THE DETERMINANTS OF FISCAL PERFORMANCE: A SELECTIVE LITERATURE REVIEW""; ""III. BUDGET INSTITUTIONS IN NEW AND POTENTIAL EU MEMBER STATES""; ""IV. BENCHMARK RESULTS""; ""V. THE ROLE OF DEEPER DETERMINANTS: TIME-INVARIANT FACTORS""; ""VI. DIFFERENTIATING THE EFFECTS ON EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES""; ""VII. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""
- Notes:
- "May 2006."
- Includes bibliographical references.
- Description based on print version record.
- ISBN:
- 9786613821133
- 9781462396221
- 1462396224
- 9781452705750
- 1452705755
- 9781282447936
- 1282447939
- 9781451987256
- 1451987250
- OCLC:
- 712989247
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