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Banks’ Precautionary Capital and Persistent Credit Crunches / Fabian Valencia.

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Format:
Book
Government document
Author/Creator:
Valencia, Fabian.
Series:
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2008/248
IMF working paper ; WP/08/248
IMF Working Papers
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Financial crises--United States--Econometric models.
Financial crises.
Bank capital--United States--Econometric models.
Bank capital.
Bank failures--United States--Econometric models.
Bank failures.
Credit--United States--Econometric models.
Credit.
Risk--United States--Econometric models.
Risk.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (37 p.)
Edition:
1st ed.
Place of Publication:
Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2008.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
Periods of banking distress are often followed by sizable and long-lasting contractions in bank credit. They may be explained by a declined demand by financially impaired borrowers (the conventional financial accelerator) or by lower supply by capital-constrained banks, a "credit crunch". This paper develops a bank model to study credit crunches and their real effects. In this model, banks maintain a precautionary level of capital that serves as a smoothing mechanism to avert disruptions in the supply of credit when hit by small shocks. However, for larger shocks, highly persistent credit crunches may arise even when the impulse is a one time, non-serially correlated event. From a policy perspective, the model justifies the use of public funds to recapitalize banks following a significant deterioration in their capital position.
Contents:
Contents; I. Introduction; II. Banks and the Real Economy; III. The Model; A. The Loan Contract; B. The Bank's Optimization Problem; C. Solution; D. Risk and the Target Level of Solvency; IV. Quantitative Experiments; V. Bank Recapitalization; VI. Conclusions; Figures; 1. Bank Credit as Percentage of GDP, Selected Countries; 2. Optimal Policy Functions; 3. Target Level of Solvency; 4. Responses to a Negative Transitory Productivity Shock; 5. Responses to an Interest Rate Increase; 6. Responses to a Large Negative Shock, With and Without Recapitalization
7. Credit Crunch Severity and Bank Recapitalization Tables; 1. Bank's Sequence of Events; 2. Public Recapitalization Costs for Selected Crises Episodes; 3. Sensitivity Analysis to a 2-σ Productivity Shock; 4. Bank's Solvency Regions; Appendix; 8. Deposit Interest Rate; References
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references.
Description based on online resource; title from PDF front page (ebrary, viewed February 26, 2014).
ISBN:
9786612841996
9781462358816
1462358810
9781452749075
1452749078
9781451871067
1451871066
9781282841994
1282841998
OCLC:
874177680

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