Outcomes-Based Conditionality : Its Role and Optimal Design / Anna Ivanova.

Format:

Book

Government document

Author/Creator:

Ivanova, Anna.

Series:

IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2006/128

IMF Working Papers

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Conditionality (International relations).

International finance.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (25 p.)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2006.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

The paper employs a principal-agent framework to analyze the role and design of outcomesbased conditionality in the presence of market frictions and domestic opposition. The results suggest that outcomes-based conditionality is a good option for the IMF when opposition to reforms is relatively weak and when the IMF loan is unsubsidized. The only role conditionality ends up playing in this case is that of an efficiency tool. The benefits of outcomes-based conditionality in the presence of strong opposition are less clear, and using this conditionality as an incentive tool would require that IMF financing be subsidized.

Contents:

""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. THE MODEL""; ""III. OBSERVABLE CASE""; ""IV. UNOBSERVABLE CASE""; ""V. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""

Notes:

"May 2006."

Includes bibliographical references.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

9786613826251

9781462380077

1462380077

9781452771335

1452771332

9781283513807

1283513803

9781451984231

1451984235

OCLC:

694141224