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Political Risk Aversion / Laura Valderrama.

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Format:
Book
Government document
Author/Creator:
Valderrama, Laura.
Contributor:
International Monetary Fund.
Series:
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2009/194
IMF Working Papers
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Uncertainty.
Rational expectations (Economic theory).
Physical Description:
26 p. : ill.
Edition:
1st ed.
Place of Publication:
Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2009.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
This paper studies the effect of individual uncertainty on collective decision-making to implement innovation. We show how individual uncertainty creates a bias for the status quo even under irreversible voting decisions, in contrast with Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). Blocking innovation is rooted in the aversion to the potential loss of political clout in future voting decisions. Thus, risk neutral individuals exhibit what we call political risk aversion. Yet individual uncertainty is not all bad news as it may open the door to institutional reform. We endogenize institutional reform and show a non-monotonic relationship between institutional efficiency and the size of innovation.
Contents:
Cover Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Contents
I. Introduction
II. Basic Model
A. Economic Environment
B. Technology Choice
C. Aggregate Uncertainty
III. Institutional Reform
A. Outside Ownership
B. Endogenizing Ownership
C. Dominated Employee Ownership
IV. Efficieny, Innovation, and Labor Mobility
A. Partnership Efficiency
1. Technological and Institutional Efficiency
B. Institutional Efficiency
2. Endogeneous ownership
V. Discussion
A. How does the model fit the facts?
B. Foundations of Individual Uncertainty
C. Heterogeneous Investors
VI. Related Literature
VII. Concluding Remarks
References
Footnotes.
Notes:
Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
Includes bibliographical references.
Description based on print version record.
ISBN:
9786612844034
9781462391080
1462391087
9781452709703
145270970X
9781282844032
1282844032
9781451873412
1451873417
OCLC:
649468877

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