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Targeting Social Transfers to the Poor in Mexico / David Coady, Susan Parker.

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Format:
Book
Government document
Author/Creator:
Coady, David.
Contributor:
Parker, Susan.
International Monetary Fund.
Series:
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2009/060
IMF Working Papers
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Public welfare--Mexico.
Public welfare.
Social service--Mexico.
Social service.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (32 p.)
Edition:
1st ed.
Place of Publication:
Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2009.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
Mexico’s main social support program, Oportunidades, combines two methods to target cash to poor households: an initial self-selection by households who acquire knowledge about the program and apply for benefits, followed by an administrative determination of eligibility based on a means test. Self-selection improves targeting by excluding high-income households, while administrative targeting does so mainly by excluding middle-income households. The two methods are complementary: expanding program knowledge across households substantially increases applications from non-poor households, thus reinforcing the importance of administrative targeting. The paper shows that targeting can be further improved through redesigning the means test and differentiating transfers according to demographic characteristics.
Contents:
Contents; I. Introduction; II. Program and Data Description; Program Description; Tables; 1. Variables and Weights Used to Estimate the Discriminant Proxy-Means Score; Data Description; 2. Transfer Levels by Grade and Gender (pesos per month, 2002); III. Methodology; IV. Results; Figures; 1. Unconditional Probabilities; Targeting Performance Across Participation Stages; 2. Conditional Probabilities; 3. Targeting Performance by Stage; 4. Share of Targeting Performance by Stage; 5. Share of Targeting Performance by Stage; Policy Reform Simulations
3. Trade-off Between Vertical Targeting Performance and Program CoverageV. Summary; Appendix; Details of Simulations Estimating Targeting Implications of Universal Knowledge; Appendix Tables; 1. Results for Conditional Application and Acceptance Outcomes and Consumption Model; 2. Application Outcomes Under Universal Knowledge; References
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references.
Description based on print version record.
ISBN:
9786612842818
9781462344680
1462344682
9781452792453
1452792453
9781282842816
1282842811
9781451872071
1451872070
OCLC:
469142141

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