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Blinders, blunders, and wars : what America and China can learn / David C. Gompert, Hans Binnendijk, Bonny Lin.

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Gompert, David C., author.
Binnendijk, Hans, author.
Lin, Bonny, author.
Contributor:
Rand Corporation. National Security Research Division.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
War--Decision making--Case studies.
War.
Strategy--Case studies.
Strategy.
Military history--Case studies.
Military history.
United States--Military policy--Decision making.
United States.
China--Military policy--Decision making.
China.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (601 p.)
Place of Publication:
RAND Corporation 2014
Santa Monica, California : RAND, 2014.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
The history of wars caused by misjudgments, from Napoleon's invasion of Russia to America's invasion of Iraq, reveals that leaders relied on cognitive models that were seriously at odds with objective reality. Blinders, Blunders, and Wars analyzes eight historical examples of strategic blunders regarding war and peace and four examples of decisions that turned out well, and then applies those lessons to the current Sino-American case.
Contents:
Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures and Tables; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE: Introduction; Blunders; A Brief History of Blunders; Strategic Decisionmaking; Models of Reality; Blunders and Information; Structure of the Study; Conclusion; CHAPTER TWO: The Information Value Chain and the Use of Information for Strategic Decisionmaking; The Role of Information in War and Peace; The Information Value Chain; Information and Strategic Blunders; Technology and the Information Value Chain; Individuals and Institutions in the Information Value Chain
Road MapCHAPTER THREE: Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, 1812; Man of Destiny; The Russia Problem; Planning for the Best; Hunger, Cold, and Cossacks; Flawed Model of Reality; He Could Have Known Better; CHAPTER FOUR: The American Decision to Go to War with Spain, 1898; Looking for the Right War; Late Nineteenth-Century America and Its Ambitions; The War with Great Britain That Wasn't; Targeting Spain; The Decision; The Results; The Decisionmaking and What to Learn from It; CHAPTER FIVE: Germany's Decision to Conduct Unrestricted U-boat Warfare, 1916; Germany's Dilemma; Kaiser in a Corner
The Military Prevails-Germany LosesWhy Were the Risks Minimized?; The Worst of All Options; CHAPTER SIX: Woodrow Wilson's Decision to Enter World War I, 1917; Ending American Neutrality; Wilson Hesitates, Maneuvers, Then Decides; Realism and Idealism; Reluctant but Right; CHAPTER SEVEN: Hitler's Decision to Invade the USSR, 1941; Hitler's Momentous Mistake; Reversing Defeat and Gazing to the East; The Decision for Operation Barbarossa; From Victory to Defeat; Understanding Hitler and His Environment; A Flawed Theory of Success; Conclusion; CHAPTER EIGHT: Japan's Attack on Pearl Harbor, 1941
Imperial Japan Colonizes ChinaU.S. Backlash; Fateful Decision; Moves Toward War; Decisionmaking in Tokyo; Pyrrhic Victory; Japan's Flawed Model of Success; Conclusion; CHAPTER NINE: U.S.-Soviet Showdown over the Egyptian Third Army, 1973; The Makings of U.S.-Soviet Confrontation; The Fate of the Third Army; Anatomy of Decision; Success; Getting It Right; CHAPTER TEN: China's Punitive War Against Vietnam, 1979; Mitigated Blunder; The Road to War; The Decision to Punish Vietnam; Assessing the War; Deng as Decisionmaker; CHAPTER ELEVEN: The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 1979
The Beginning of the EndMonumental Mistake; Mission Creep, Soviet Style; What Were They Thinking?; Failure to Imagine What Would Happen; CHAPTER TWELVE: The Soviet Decision Not to Invade Poland, 1981; Counterrevolution in Poland; From a Reluctant Yes to a Maybe to an Adamant No; Conversion on the Road to Warsaw; The Days and Years to Follow; Were the Soviets Thinking Straight?; Lessons for Strategic Decisionmaking; CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Argentina's Invasion of the Falklands (Malvinas), 1982; As Bad as a Blunder Can Be; Argentine Fury and Folly; In a Trap of Their Own Making; Unhinged from Reality
Rational but Wrong
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references.
Description based on print version record.
ISBN:
0-8330-8778-9
0-8330-8780-0
OCLC:
897510781
Access Restriction:
Open access Unrestricted online access

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