My Account Log in

3 options

Inadvertent Escalation : Conventional War and Nuclear Risks / Barry R. Posen.

De Gruyter Cornell University Press Complete eBook-Package 2014-2015 Available online

View online

De Gruyter Cornell University Press eBook Package Archive Pre-2000 Available online

View online

Ebook Central Academic Complete Available online

View online
Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Posen, Barry, author.
Series:
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs Series
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Escalation (Military science).
Nuclear threshold (Strategy).
Limited war.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (295 p.)
Edition:
1st ed.
Place of Publication:
Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, [2013]
Language Note:
English
Summary:
In this sobering book, Barry R. Posen demonstrates how the interplay between conventional military operations and nuclear forces could, in conflicts among states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, inadvertently produce pressures for nuclear escalation. Knowledge of these hidden pressures, he believes, may help some future decision maker avoid catastrophe. Building a formidable argument that moves with cumulative force, he details the way in which escalation could occur not by mindless accident, or by deliberate preference for nuclear escalation, but rather as a natural accompaniment of land, naval, or air warfare at the conventional level. Posen bases his analysis on an empirical study of the east-west military competition in Europe during the 1980's, using a conceptual framework drawn from international relations theory, organization theory, and strategic theory. The lessons of his book, however, go well beyond the east-west competition. Since his observations are relevant to all military competitions between states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, his book speaks to some of the problems that attend the proliferation of nuclear weapons in longstanding regional conflicts. Optimism that small and medium nuclear powers can easily achieve "stable" nuclear balances is, he believes, unwarranted.
Contents:
Front matter
Contents
Tables
Figures
Preface
1. Introduction: A Model of Inadvertent Escalation
2. Air War and Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation
3. The Balance of Ground Forces on the Central Front
4. Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank
5. "Offensive" and "Defensive" Sea Control: A Comparative Assessment
6. Conclusion
APPENDIX 1. The Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) Model
APPENDIX 2. Central Region Close Air Support Aircraft and Attack Helicopters (1988)
APPENDIX 3. The Attrition-FEBA Expansion Model: Symphony Version
APPENDIX 4. A Barrier Defense Model
Selected Bibliography
Index
Notes:
Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed May. 17, 2017)
ISBN:
9780801468377
080146837X
9780801468384
0801468388
OCLC:
849921500

The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.

Find

Home Release notes

My Account

Shelf Request an item Bookmarks Fines and fees Settings

Guides

Using the Find catalog Using Articles+ Using your account