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Dynamic noncooperative game models for deregulated electricity markets / Jose B. Cruz, Jr. and Xiaohuan Tan.

EBSCOhost Academic eBook Collection (North America) Available online

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Ebook Central Academic Complete Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Cruz, Jose B. (Jose Behar), 1932-
Contributor:
Tan, Xiaohuan.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Electric utilities--Mathematical models.
Electric utilities.
Noncooperative games (Mathematics).
Physical Description:
1 online resource (121 p.)
Edition:
1st ed.
Place of Publication:
Hauppauge N,Y, : Nova Science Publisher, c2009.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
The deregulated electricity markets are expected to be perfectly competitive, yet they remain oligopolistic in which the market participants are able to exercise market power to "game" the markets. Game theory, by its nature, is considered as the appropriate framework to study the interactive behaviours of decision makers with conflict of interest. Substantial research has been devoted to study gaming behaviour in the deregulated electricity market using game theory. However, most of the modelling of the markets is static and this type of model leads to non-optimal results for long-term strategic planning due to the inherent dynamic nature of the market. This book formulates and describes the gaming behaviour in the deregulated electricity market from a dynamic point of view, considering long-term interests in a changing environment. It starts with a review of the current situation of deregulation and a brief review of near-term energy issues. The book includes the latest results on bidding dynamic strategies for such markets.
Contents:
Restructuring in the electricity industry
Game theory and strategic bidding
Adaptation for N-person games
Sensitivity analysis of uncertainties
Price strategies in mixed-strategy solutions
Conclusion.
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references (p. [85]-98) and index.
ISBN:
1-61122-343-1
OCLC:
669509338

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