Mind ascribed : an elaboration and defence of interpretivism / Bruno Mölder.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Mölder, Bruno.

Series:

Advances in consciousness research ; 80.

Advances in consciousness research ; 80

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Philosophy of mind.

Philosophy.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (308 p.)

Place of Publication:

Amsterdam ; Philadelphia : John Benjamins Pub. Co., c2010.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

This book provides a thoroughly worked out and systematic presentation of an interpretivist position in the philosophy of mind, of the view that having mental properties is a matter of interpretation. Bruno Mölder elaborates and defends a particular version of interpretivism, the ascription theory, which explicates the possession of mental states with contents in terms of their canonical ascribability, and shows how it can withstand various philosophical challenges. Apart from a defence of the ascription theory from the objections commonly directed against interpretivism, the book provides a critical analysis of major alternative accounts of mental state possession as well as the interpretivist ideas originating from Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett. The viability of the approach is demonstrated by showing how one can treat mental causation as well as the faculties closely connected with consciousness - perception and the awareness of one's own mental states - in the interpretivist framework. (Series A).

Contents:

Mind Ascribed

Editorial page

Title page

LCC data

Dedication

Table of contents

Acknowledgements

1. Preliminaries

1.1 Mind and content: First steps

1.2 Truth and meaning

1.3 A road map

Part I. Towards interpretivism

2. How not to have a mind

2.1 A general metaphysical scheme: Pleonastic properties and the natural basis

2.2 Mind-body relations

2.3 Supervenience

2.4 Reduction and identity

2.5 Realisation and functionalism

2.6 Ascription theory and explanatory relations

3. Interpretivism

3.1 Varieties of interpretivism

3.2 Donald Davidson and radical interpretation

3.3 Daniel Dennett and the intentional stance

3.4 Some roots of divergence

3.4.1 Rationality

3.4.2 The sources of evidence for interpretation

3.4.3 Explaining meaning

Part II. Elaborating and defending the ascription theory

4. Folk psychology and mental terms

4.1 Common-sense functionalism and the meaning of mental terms

4.2 Natural kinds and the reference of mental terms

4.3 The role of folk psychology in the ascription theory

5. The ascription theory

5.1 Preliminaries

5.2 The ascription sources

5.3 Modelling the coherence

5.4 The canonical ascription

5.5 The indeterminacy and uncodifiability of the mental

6. Objections and defence

6.1 Objections

6.1.1 The circularity charge

6.1.2 The regress objection

6.1.3 Intrinsic intentionality

6.1.4 Liberalism and chauvinism

6.1.5 Observer-dependence

6.2 Arguing for interpretivism

6.2.1 The consideration from behavioural criteria

6.2.2 The consideration from the publicity of meaning

6.2.3 The consideration from folk psychology

6.2.4 The consideration from stance-dependent patterns

Part III. Extending the view

7. Interpretivism and mental causation

7.1 Davidson on mental causation.

7.2 Troubles with the causal role of the mental

7.3 Causal explanation and causation

7.4 Causal efficacy and causal relevance

7.5 The relevance of mental causation

8. Perception

8.1 The specificity of perception

8.2 The factivity constraint

8.3 The veridicality of perception

8.4 The content of perceptual states

8.5 Non-conceptual content in the ascription theory

8.6 Phenomenology, non-conceptual content and protocontent

9. Self-knowledge

9.1 Approaches to self-knowledge

9.2 Self-constitution

9.3 First-person operationalism

9.4 The idea of a mechanism

9.5 The ascriptionist model of self-knowledge

10. Conclusion

References

Index

The series Advances in Consciousness Research.

Notes:

Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9786612721571

9781282721579

1282721577

9789027287748

9027287740

OCLC:

663881336