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Will as commitment and resolve : an existential account of creativity, love, virtue, and happiness / John Davenport.

De Gruyter Fordham University Press Complete eBook-Package Pre-2014 Available online

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Ebook Central Academic Complete Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Davenport, John J., 1966-
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Will.
Ethics.
Conduct of life.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (xxiv, 706 p. )
Edition:
1st ed.
Place of Publication:
New York : Fordham University Press, 2007.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
In contemporary philosophy, the will is often regarded as a sheer philosophical fiction. In Will as Commitment and Resolve, Davenport argues not only that the will is the central power of human agency that makes decisions and forms intentions but also that it includes the capacity to generate new motivation different in structure from prepurposive desires. The concept of "projective motivation" is the central innovation in Davenport's existential account of the everyday notion of striving will. Beginning with the contrast between "eastern" and "western" attitudes toward assertive willing, Davenport traces the lineage of the idea of projective motivation from NeoPlatonic and Christian conceptions of divine motivation to Scotus, Kant, Marx, Arendt, and Levinas. Rich with historical detail, this book includes an extended examination of Platonic and Aristotelian eudaimonist theories of human motivation. Drawing on contemporary critiques of egoism, Davenport argues that happiness is primarily a byproduct of activities and pursuits aimed at other agent-transcending goods for their own sake. In particular, the motives in virtues and in the practices as defined by Alasdair MacIntyre are projective rather than eudaimonist. This theory is supported by analyses of radical evil, accounts of intrinsic motivation in existential psychology, and contemporary theories of identity-forming commitment in analytic moral psychology. Following Viktor Frankl, Joseph Raz, and others, Davenport argues that Harry Frankfurt's conception of caring requires objective values worth caring about, which serve as rational grounds for projecting new final ends. The argument concludes with a taxonomy of values or goods, devotion to which can make life meaningful for us.
Contents:
Frontmatter
Contents
Acknowledgments
Preface: The Project of an Existential Theory of Personhood
1. Introduction
2. The Heroic Will in Eastern and Western Perspectives
3. From Action Theory to Projective Motivation
4. The Erosiac Structure of Desire in Plato and Aristotle
5. Aristotelian Desires and the Problems of Egoism
6. Psychological Eudaimonism: A Reading of Aristotle
7. The Paradox of Eudaimonism: An Existential Critique
8. Contemporary Solutions to the Paradox and Their Problems
9. Divine and Human Creativity: From Plato to Levinas
10. Radical Evil and Projective Strength of Will
11. Scotus and Kant: The Moral Will and Its Limits
12. Existential Psychology and Intrinsic Motivation: Deci, Maslow, and Frankl
13. Caring, Aretaic Commitment, and Existential Resolve
14. An Existential Objectivist Account of What Is Worth Caring About
Conclusion: The Danger of Willfulness Revisited
Notes
Glossary of Definitions, Technical Terms, and Abbreviations
Bibliography
Index
Notes:
Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
Includes bibliographical references (p. 665-689) and index.
Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
ISBN:
9786612698675
9780823225729
0823225720
9780823235896
0823235890
9780823246861
0823246868
9781282698673
1282698672
9780823238804
0823238806
9780823225774
0823225771
OCLC:
647876515

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