The natural resources trap : private investment without public commitment / edited by William Hogan and Federico Sturzenegger.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Hogan, William W.

Sturzenegger, Federico.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Natural resources--Government policy.

Natural resources.

Natural resources--Law and legislation.

Investments, Foreign.

Public-private sector cooperation.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xiv, 519 p.) : ill.

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, c2010.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

"This book is important and timely, bringing together some of the world's leading economists. The theory chapters provide new insights and apply new developments in contract theory to the problems of natural resources and credible host country policies. The case studies provide up-to-date illustrations of the difficulties and development of host country policy in Latin America and the UK." Roderick Duncan, Charles Sturt University, Australia "This book is likely to become a standard reference in the area of natural resources and credible host country policies-coming, as it does, with a solid grounding in modern economic theory." Tim Worrall, University of Manchester Volatility in commodity prices has been accompanied by perpetual renegotiation of contracts between private investors in natural resource production and the governments of states with mineral and energy wealth. When prices skyrocket, governments want a larger share of revenues, sometimes to the point of nationalization or expropriation; when prices fall, larger state participation becomes a burden and the private sectoris called back in. Recent and newsworthy changes in the price of oil (which fell from an all-time high of $147 in mid-2008 to $40 by year's end) are notable for their speed and the steepness of their rise and fall, but the up-and-down pattern itself is not unusual. If the unpredictability of commodity prices is so predictable, why do contracts not allow for this with mechanisms that would provide a more stable commercial framework? In The Natural Resources Trap, top scholars address this guestion in terms of both theory and practice. Theoretical contributions range across a number of fields, from contract theory to public finance, and treat topics that include taxation, royalties, and expropriation cycles. Case studies examine experiences in the U.K., Bolivia, Argentina, Venezuela, and other parts of the world. --Book Jacket.

Contents:

Intro

Contents

Contributors

Preface

1 Contracts and Investment in Natural Resources

I Theoretical Papers

2 Petroleum Contracts

Commentary: Lawrence H. Summers

3 Sovereign Theft

Commentary: Jeromin Zettelmeyer

4 A Resource Belief Curse?

Commentary: George-Marios Angeletos

5 Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts under Threat of Expropriation

6 Denying the Temptation to GRAB

7 Dealing with Expropriations

Commentary: Erich Muehlegger

8 Pricing Expropriation Risk in Natural Resource Contracts

Commentary: Robert Pindyck

II Country Cases

9 Credibility, Commitment, and Regulation

Commentary: Jeffrey Frankel

10 Hydrocarbon Policy, Shocks, and the Collective Imagination

Commentary: Fernando Candia Castillo

11 Urgency and Betrayal

Commentary: Louis Wells

12 The Political Economy of Oil Contract Renegotiation in Venezuela

Commentary: Ramón Espinasa

III Conclusion

Epilogue

Appendix

Index.

Notes:

Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph

OCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9786612736995

9780262310109

0262310104

9781282736993

128273699X

9780262275538

0262275538

OCLC:

648759758

Publisher Number:

9786612736995