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Order without law : how neighbors settle disputes / Robert C. Ellickson.

De Gruyter Harvard University Press eBook Package Archive 1896-1999 Available online

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EBSCOhost Academic eBook Collection (North America) Available online

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Ebook Central Academic Complete Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Ellickson, Robert C.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Sociological jurisprudence.
Dispute resolution (Law)--California--Shasta County.
Dispute resolution (Law).
Compromise (Law)--California--Shasta County.
Compromise (Law).
Trespass--California--Shasta County.
Trespass.
Cattle--California--Shasta County.
Cattle.
Social control.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (ix,302p.)
Edition:
1st ed.
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 1991.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
Integrating the current research in law, economics, sociology, game theory and anthropology, this text demonstrates that people largely govern themselves by means of informal rules - social norms - without the need for a state or other central co-ordinator to lay down the law.
In Order without Law Robert C. Ellickson shows that law is far less important than is generally thought. He demonstrates that people largely govern themselves by means of informal rules-social norms-that develop without the aid of a state or other central coordinator. Integrating the latest scholarship in law, economics, sociology, game theory, and anthropology, Ellickson investigates the uncharted world within which order is successfully achieved without law. The springboard for Ellickson's theory of norms is his close investigation of a variety of disputes arising from the damage created by escaped cattle in Shasta County, California. In "The Problem of Social Cost" --the most frequently cited article on law--economist Ronald H. Cease depicts farmers and ranchers as bargaining in the shadow of the law while resolving cattle-trespass disputes. Ellickson's field study of this problem refutes many of the behavioral assumptions that underlie Coase's vision, and will add realism to future efforts to apply economic analysis to law. Drawing examples from a wide variety of social contexts, including whaling grounds, photocopying centers, and landlord-tenant relations, Ellickson explores the interaction between informal and legal rules and the usual domains in which these competing systems are employed. Order without Law firmly grounds its analysis in real-world events, while building a broad theory of how people cooperate to mutual advantage.
Contents:
Introduction Part I. Shasta County 1. Shasta County and Its Cattle Industry 2. The Politics of Cattle Trespass 3. The Resolution of Cattle-Trespass Disputes 4. Who Pays for Boundary Fences? 5. Disputes Arising out of Highway Collisions Involving Livestock 6. The Effects of Closed-Range Ordinances Part II. A Theory of Norms 7. The System of Social Control S. Shortcomings of Current Theories of Social Control 9. The Puzzle of Cooperation 10. A Hypothesis of Welfare-Maximizing Norms 11. Substantive Norms: Of Bees, Cattle, and Whales 12. Remedial Norms: Of Carrots and Sticks 13. Procedural and Constitutive Norms: Of Gossip, Ritual, and Hero Worship 14. Controller-Selecting Norms: Of Contracts, Custom, and Photocopies Part III. The Future of Norms 15. Testing the Content of Norms 16. Conclusions and Implications Appendix. Research Methods Index
Notes:
Includes index.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:
9780674263277
0674263278
9780674036437
0674036433
OCLC:
923109758

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