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Rule-following and realism / Gary Ebbs.

De Gruyter Harvard University Press eBook Package Archive 1896-1999 Available online

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EBSCOhost Academic eBook Collection (North America) Available online

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Ebook Central Academic Complete Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Ebbs, Gary.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Meaning (Philosophy)--History--20th century.
Meaning (Philosophy).
Language and languages--Philosophy.
Language and languages.
Realism--Controversial literature.
Realism.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (xvi,368p.)
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 1997.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
Ebbs presents systematic redescriptions of our linguistic practices that transform our understanding of such central topics as rule-following, the analytic-synthetic distinction, realism, anti-individualism, self-knowledge and scepticism.
Through detailed criticism of standard interpretations of key arguments in analytical philosophy over the last 60 years, this book aims to present a new conception of the proper starting point and task of the philosophy of language. To understand central topics in the philosophy of language and mind, the author contends we must investigate them from our perspective as participants in shared linguistic practices. However, our efforts at adopting this participant perspective are limited by our lingering loyalties to metaphysical realism and scientific naturalism. The book aims to loosen the hold of these views by exposing their roots and developing a different way of looking at our linguistic practices. A systematic rediscription of our linguistic practices is presented, and aims to transform our understanding of such central topics as rule-following, realism, and anti-individualism.
Contents:
Frontmatter
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Introduction
I Rule-Following
ONE Kripke’s Skepticism about Meaning
TWO Quine’s Scientific Skepticism about Meaning
THREE The Very Idea of a Participant Perspective
II The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction
FOUR Carnap’s Analytic-Synthetic Distinction
FIVE Quine’s Reasons for Rejecting Carnap’s Analytic-Synthetic Distinction
SIX Putnam’s Reasons for Rejecting Carnap’s Analytic-Synthetic Distinction
III Anti-Individualism
SEVEN From the Rejection of the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction to Anti-Individualism
EIGHT Participation, Deference, and Dialectic
NINE Realism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism
TEN Anti-Individualism and Rule-Following
NOTES
INDEX
Notes:
Includes index.
Includes bibliographical references (p. [313]-363) and index.
ISBN:
9780674034419
0674034414
OCLC:
923111311

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