The reflexive nature of consciousness / Greg Janzen.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Janzen, Greg.

Series:

Advances in consciousness research ; v. 72.

Advances in consciousness research, 1381-589X ; v. 72

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Consciousness.

Phenomenology.

Self-consciousness (Awareness).

Self.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (197 p.)

Place of Publication:

Amsterdam ; Philadelphia : John Benjamins Pub. Co., c2008.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Combining phenomenological insights from Brentano and Sartre, but also drawing on recent work on consciousness by analytic philosophers, this book defends the view that conscious states are reflexive, and necessarily so, i.e., that they have a built-in, "implicit" awareness of their own occurrence, such that the subject of a conscious state has an immediate, non-objectual acquaintance with it. As part of this investigation, the book also explores the relationship between reflexivity and the phenomenal, or "what-it-is-like," dimension of conscious experience, defending the innovative thesis that phenomenal character is constituted by the implicit self-awareness built into every conscious state. This account stands in marked contrast to most influential extant theories of phenomenal character, including qualia theories, according to which phenomenal character is a matter of having phenomenal sensations, and representationalism, according to which phenomenal character is constituted by representational content. (Series A).

Contents:

Introduction

Conscious states, reflexivity, and phenomenal character

Some remarks on methodology

Some semantics of "consciousness"

Preamble

Creature consciousness : transitive and intransitive

State consciousness

Unconscious mental states

Self-consciousness

Phenomenal consciousness

A formula for state consciousness

Nagel's what-it-is-like formula

Putative counterexamples

Non-conscious phenomenality?

Summary

Consciousness and self-awareness

A gloss on intentionality

The transitivity principle

Two positive arguments for the transitivity principle

Higher-orderism

The higher-order theory of consciousness

A "one-state" alternative

The Brentanian model

Objections and replies

Representationalism

The representational theory of phenomenal character

The nature of phenomenal character

Phenomenal character as implicit self-awareness

Some brief remarks on privacy

Conclusion.

Notes:

Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph

Includes bibliographical references (p. [173]-182) and indexes.

ISBN:

1-282-15234-3

9786612152344

90-272-9168-3

OCLC:

648354237