The situated self / J.T. Ismael.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Ismael, Jenann, 1968-

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Self (Philosophy).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (261 p.)

Place of Publication:

Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2007.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

This text focuses on the metaphysics and the philosophy of language and mind. It tackles a philosophical question whose origin goes back to Descartes: What am I? The self is not a mere thing among things - but if so, what is it, and what is its relationship to the world?

Contents:

Intro

Contents

1. Introduction

Part I: The Situated Mind

2. Traditional Representationalism

2.1 Burge on Belief De Re

2.2 Perry: Thought without Representation

3. Confinement

3.1 The Model-Theoretic Argument

3.2 Architectural vs. Semantic Relations

3.3 Conclusion

4. The Dynamical Approach

4.1 The Central Notions

4.2 Coordinating Media with One Another

4.3 Conclusion

5. Self-Description

5.1 Exemplification

5.2 Thought and Experience

5.3 General Themes

5.4 Internal World-Models and Self-Representational Loops

5.5 Physical and Phenomenal Concepts

6. Context and Coordination

6.1 The General Dynamic

6.2 Mechanical Metaphor

6.3 Imposing vs. Revealing Articulation

6.4 Unarticulated Constituents

6.5 Coordinating Notions with Particulars: Space and Time

6.6 Conclusion

7. Self-Representation, Objectivity, and Intentionality

7.1 Dretske's Question

7.2 Objective Purport

7.3 Why Do We Self-Represent?

7.4 How Is This Possible?

7.5 Loose Ends

7.6 Conclusion

Part II: Understanding Arguments for Dualism

8. Jackson's Mary

8.1 What Mary Learns

8.2 Incompleteness?

8.3 Refining Ideas: The Direction of Development

8.4 In Sum

8.5 The Space of Reasons and the Space of Causes

9. Inverted Spectra

9.1 Is Spectrum Inversion Possible?

9.2 Exemplars

9.3 Language

9.4 A Lesson about Language

9.5 Interplanetary Analogy of 'Left' and 'Right'

9.6 Language and Phenomenal Content

9.7 Quining Qualia

9.8 Worries about Realism

9.9 Chalmers

9.10 Conclusion

10. Grammatical Illusions

10.1 McTaggart's Argument

10.2 The Resolution

10.3 Other Examples: Space and Family Trees

10.4 McTaggart Modalized

10.5 Why the Illusion Is Compelling

10.6 The Self

10.7 The Lesson

10.8 Phenomenal Properties

Part III: Selves.

11. Identity over Time

11.1 Reflexive Accounts

11.2 Problems with Identity over Time

11.3 Post Hoc Conceptualization

11.4 From Informational to Conceptual Content

11.5 Drawing the Boundaries

11.6 Connecting with Earlier Themes

11.7 Why the Temporally Extended Self?

11.8 Other Views about Identity over Time

11.9 Parfittean and Fregean Views

11.10 No-Subject Views

11.11 Conclusion

12. The Unified Self

12.1 Dennett

12.2 The Inner Monologue

12.3 Deliberation

12.4 The Many Voices of Dennett

12.5 Self-Presentation, Phenomenology, and Consciousness

12.6 Unity

12.7 Conclusion

13. Reprise

Bibliography

Index

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

K

L

M

N

O

P

Q

R

S

T

U

V

W

Z.

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 233-237) and index.

Description based on metadata supplied by the publisher and other sources.

ISBN:

0-19-029174-5

0-19-537503-3

1-281-15652-3

9786611156527

0-19-534661-0

1-4294-6884-X

OCLC:

922953870