4 options
Strategic foundations of general equilibrium : dynamic matching and bargaining games / Douglas Gale.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Gale, Douglas, author.
- Series:
- Churchill lectures in economics.
- Churchill lectures in economics
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Competition.
- Equilibrium (Economics).
- Game theory.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (xi, 219 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).
- Edition:
- 1st ed.
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Language Note:
- English
- Summary:
- The theory of competition has held a central place in economic analysis since Adam Smith. This book, written by one of the most distinguished of contemporary economic theorists, reports on a major research program to provide strategic foundations for the theory of perfect competition. Beginning with a concise survey of how the theory of competition has evolved, Gale makes extensive and rigorous use of dynamic matching and bargaining models to provide a more complete description of how a competitive equlibrium is achieved. Whereas economists have made use of a macroscopic description of markets in which certain behavioral characteristics, such as price-taking behavior, are taken for granted, Gale uses game theory to re-evaluate this assumption, beginning with individual agents and modelling their strategic interaction. A strategic foundation for competitive equilibrium shows how such interaction leads to competitive, price-taking behavior. Essential reading for graduate courses in game theory and general equilibrium.
- Contents:
- Markets and games
- Strategic foundations of perfect competition
- Why strategic foundations?
- Cooperative market games
- Non-cooperative market games
- Dynamic matching and bargaining models
- Open questions
- Perfect competition
- Pure exchange economics
- Dynamic matching and bargaining games
- Equilibrium
- The Edgeworth Property
- Efficiency
- Competitive sequences of economies
- Existence
- Efficiency with discounting
- Random matching
- Mixed equilibria
- A summing up
- Continuity and anonymity
- Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990)
- Bounded rationality and uniqueness
- The Limit Principle
- Repeated games
- Limited memory
- Large anonymous games
- Non-anonymous games
- Bounded rationality
- Imitation and experimentation
- A behavioral model of competition
- Convergence to competitive prices
- Extensions.
- Notes:
- Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
- Includes bibliographical references (p. 208-213) and index.
- ISBN:
- 1-107-11659-7
- 0-511-49231-6
- 0-511-31101-X
- 1-280-15376-8
- 0-511-05188-3
- 0-511-11744-2
- 0-521-64330-9
- 0-511-15224-8
- OCLC:
- 475915489
The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.