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The rational design of international institutions / edited by Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, Duncan Snidal.

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Format:
Book
Contributor:
Koremenos, Barbara, editor.
Lipson, Charles, editor.
Snidal, Duncan, editor.
Series:
International organization books.
International organization books
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
International organization.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (xvii, 343 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).
Edition:
1st ed.
Place of Publication:
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
International institutions vary widely in terms of key institutional features such as membership, scope, and flexibility. In this 2004 book, Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal argue that this is so because international actors are goal-seeking agents who make specific institutional design choices to solve the particular cooperation problems they face in different issue-areas. Using a Rational Design approach, they explore five features of institutions - membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility - and explain their variation in terms of four independent variables that characterize different cooperation problems: distribution, number of actors, enforcement, and uncertainty. The contributors to the volume then evaluate a set of conjectures in specific issue areas ranging from security organizations to trade structures to rules of war to international aviation. Alexander Wendt appraises the entire Rational Design model of evaluating international organizations and the authors respond in a conclusion that sets forth both the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach.
Contents:
The rational design of international institutions / Barbara Koremenos [and others]
Trust building, trust breaking: the dilemma of NATO enlargement / Andrew Kydd
The optimal design of international trade institutions: uncertainty and escape / B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen V. Milner
Most-favored-nation clauses and cluster negotiations / Robert Pahre
Situation structure and institutional design: reciprocity, coercion, and exchange / Ronald B. Mitchell and Patricia M. Keilbach
Private justice in a global economy: from litigation to arbitration / Walter Mattli
Multilateralizing trade and payments in postwar Europe / Thomas H. Oatley
The institutional features of the Prisoners of War Treaties / James D. Morrow
Institutions for flying: how states built a market in international aviation service / John E. Richards
Driving with the rearview mirror: on the rational science of institutional design / Alexander Wendt
Rational design: looking back to move forward / Barbara Koremenos [and others].
Notes:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:
1-107-14161-3
1-280-43729-4
0-511-18407-7
0-511-16589-7
0-511-16422-X
0-511-31258-X
0-511-51220-1
0-511-16502-1
OCLC:
171138277

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