Practical rules : when we need them and when we don't / Alan H. Goldman.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Goldman, Alan H., 1945- author.

Series:

Cambridge studies in philosophy.

Cambridge studies in philosophy

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Ethics.

Rules (Philosophy).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xi, 210 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Rules proliferate; some are kept with a bureaucratic stringency bordering on the absurd, while others are manipulated and ignored in ways that injure our sense of justice. Under what conditions should we make exceptions to rules, and when should they be followed despite particular circumstances? The two dominant models in the literature on rules are the particularist account and that which sees the application of rules as normative. Taking a position that falls between these two extremes, Alan Goldman provides a systematic framework to clarify when we need to follow rules in our moral, legal and prudential decisions, and when we ought not to do so. The book distinguishes among various types of rules; it illuminates concepts such as integrity, self-interest and self-deception; and finally, it provides an account of ordinary moral reasoning without rules. This book will be of great interest to advanced students and professionals working in philosophy, law, decision theory and the social sciences.

Contents:

1. Moral Rules

I. Outline of the Task

II. Types of Rules: Dispensable and Indispensable

III. Ordinary Moral Consciousness

IV. Rules as Second-Best Strategies

V. The Justification of Rules: Strong and Weak

VI. Interpretation of Weak Rules

2. Prudential Rules

I. Moral and Prudential Rules Compared

II. Second-Order Prudential Rules: Optimizing

III. A Prudential Rule to Be Moral

3. Legal Rules

I. Classification

II. The Descriptive Question: Hart, Dworkin, and Others

III. The Descriptive Question: Sources of Law

IV. The Normative Question

4. Moral Reasoning without Rules

I. The Inadequacy of Particularism

II. Coherence

III. The Reasoning Process Reviewed

IV. Objections.

Notes:

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Includes bibliographical references (p. 197-201) and index.

ISBN:

1-107-12447-6

0-521-03407-8

0-511-04441-0

0-511-49878-0

0-511-15464-X

1-280-41926-1

0-511-17467-5

0-511-30370-X

OCLC:

437063467