Making moral sense : beyond Habermas and Gauthier / Logi Gunnarsson.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Gunnarsson, Logi, author.

Series:

Cambridge studies in philosophy.

Cambridge studies in philosophy

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Habermas, Jürgen.

Gauthier, David P.

Ethics.

Reason.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xi, 286 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Is it rational to be moral? Can moral disputes be settled rationally? Which criteria determine what we have a good reason to do? In this innovative book, Logi Gunnarsson takes issue with the assumption made by many philosophers faced with the problem of reconciling moral norms with a scientific world view, namely that morality must be offered a non-moral justification based on a formal concept of rationality. He argues that the criteria for the rationality of an action are irreducibly substantive, rather than purely formal, and that assuming that morality must be given a non-moral justification amounts to a distortion of both rationality and morality. His discussion includes substantial critical engagement with major thinkers from two very different philosophical traditions, and is notable for its clear and succinct account of Habermas' discourse ethics. It will appeal to anyone interested in practical reason and the rational credentials of morality.

Contents:

pt. I. Problems. 1. The justificatory crisis of morality. 2. Alternative resolutions of the justificatory crisis. 3. Subjective reasons. 4. Substantive reasons. 5. Overcoming rationalism

pt. II. Against Rationalism. 6. Gauthier's contractarianism. 7. From here to pre-social agreement. 8. Habermas' discourse ethics. 9. Discoursing about discourse

pt. III. For the Substantive Approach. 10. Self-understanding and self-assessment. 11. The possibility of progress. 12. Practical arguments vs. impossibility arguments. 13. Evaluation of others. 14. Universality without neutrality

pt. IV. For Particularist Substantivism. 15. Against formalism. 16. Particularist substantivism vs. list-substantivism.

Notes:

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Includes bibliographical references (p. 266-278) and index.

ISBN:

1-107-12003-9

0-521-04215-1

0-511-05006-2

0-511-31068-4

0-511-17265-6

1-280-42964-X

0-511-15149-7

0-511-48709-6

OCLC:

437072961