Free will as an open scientific problem / Mark Balaguer.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Balaguer, Mark.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Free will and determinism.

Ethics.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (213 p.)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, 2009.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

This work presents an argument that the problem of free will boils down to an open scientific question about the causal histories of certain kinds of neural events.

Contents:

Introduction

Formulating the problem of free will

The old formulation of the problem of free will

Compatibilism and the rejection of an intermediate formulation of the problem of free will

The final (or a new-and-improved) formulation of the problem of free will

Some remarks on libertarianism

Synopsis of the book

Why the compatibilism issue and the conceptual-analysis issue are metaphysically irrelevant

What determines whether an answer to the what-is-free-will question is correct

Why the what-is-free-will question is irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will

Question, assuming the OL view is correct

Question, even if the OL view isn't correct

The which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-have question

The coherence question

The moral responsibility question (and the issue of what's worth wanting)

Generalizing the argument

Why the compatibilism question reduces to the what-is-free-will question

Where we stand and where we're going next

An aside : some remarks on the what-is-free-will question, the compatibilism question, and the moral responsibility question

The what-is-free-will question and the compatibilism question

The moral responsibility question

Why the libertarian question reduces to the issue of indeterminacy

Preliminaries

Torn decisions

Indeterminacy

Appropriate non-randomness

The argument

If our torn decisions are undetermined, then we author and control them

The argument from token-token identity

The argument from phenomenology

Objections

Why TDW-indeterminism increases or procures authorship and control

Why this sort of L-freedom is worth wanting

If our torn decisions are undetermined, then they are sufficiently rational to be L-free

Plural authorship, control, and rationality non-torn decisions

Where we stand

Why there are no good arguments for or against determinism (or any other thesis that would establish or refute libertarianism)?

An a priori argument for determinism (and, hence, against TDW-indeterminism)

An a priori argument for libertarianism (and, hence, in favor of TDW-ndeterminism)

Empirical arguments

Arguments for universal determinism

Arguments for macro-level determinism or virtual macro-level determinism

Arguments for neural determinism or virtual neural determinism

Arguments for torn-decision determinism, or for virtual torn-decision

Determinism or against TDW-indeterminism

The argument from Tegmark's work

The argument from Libet's work

Arguments from psychology

Where we stand.

Notes:

OCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.

"A Bradford book."

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

0-262-26615-6

1-282-69424-3

9786612694240

0-262-25854-4

OCLC:

646857134

Publisher Number:

9786612694240