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Rolling the iron dice : historical analogies and decisions to use military force in regional contingencies / Scot Macdonald.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Macdonald, Scot, 1966-
- Series:
- Contributions in military studies ; no. 199.
- Contributions in military studies, 0883-6884 ; no. 199
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- United States--Military policy.
- United States.
- Great Britain--Military policy.
- Great Britain.
- United States--Foreign relations--1945-1989.
- Great Britain--Foreign relations--1945-.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (262 p.)
- Edition:
- 1st ed.
- Distribution:
- London : Bloomsbury Publishing, 2024
- Place of Publication:
- Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 2000.
- Language Note:
- English
- Summary:
- Does history provide lessons for foreign policy makers today? Macdonald combines cognitive psychology theories about analogical reasoning, international relations theories about military intervention, and original archival research to analyze the role of historical information in foreign policy decision making. He looks at the role of historical analogies in Anglo-American decision making during foreign policy crises involving the possible use of force in regional contingencies during a crucial period in the 1950s when the West faced an emerging Soviet threat. This study analyzes the influence of situational and individual variables in a comparison of more than ten leaders from two nations facing four different crises. Rolling the Iron Dice describes the often significant effect of historical analogies on perceptions of the adversary and of allies, time constraints, policy options and risks, as well as the justification of policy in four crises: the 1950 Korean invasion; the 1951-53 Iranian oil nationalization incident; the 1956 Suez crisis; and the 1958 crisis in Lebanon and Jordan. Contrary to both the slippery slope and the escalation models of military intervention, Macdonald argues that leaders decide extremely early in a crisis, often on the basis of an historical analogy, but also based on perceptions of the rationality of an adversary, whether to use military force. Their decision does not change unless the adversary capitulates to every demand.
- Contents:
- Cover
- ROLLING THE IRON DICE
- Contents
- Preface
- NOTES
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- WHAT IS A HISTORICAL ANALOGY?
- TYPES OF HISTORICAL ANALOGIES
- THE DECISION TO USE HISTORICAL ANALOGIES
- THE RETRIEVAL OF SPECIFIC HISTORICAL INFORMATION
- FUNCTIONS OF HISTORICAL INFORMATION AND ANALOGICAL REASONING
- DIAGNOSIS AND PRESCRIPTION OR JUSTIFICATION?
- MAPPING
- GROUP DISCUSSION
- THE EFFECT OF HISTORY
- HISTORY: THE UNCERTAIN GUIDE
- REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES AND THE USE OF FORCE
- THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IS NOT A LAST RESORT
- PART I INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES AND THE USE OF HISTORICAL INFORMATION
- 2 The Leaders
- THE BRITISH
- Clement Attlee
- Ernest Bevin
- Winston Churchill
- Anthony Eden
- Harold Macmillan
- Selwyn Lloyd
- THE AMERICANS
- Harry S. Truman
- Dean Acheson
- Dwight D. Eisenhower
- John F. Dulles
- CONCLUSION
- PART II SITUATIONAL VARIABLES AND THE USE OF HISTORICAL INFORMATION
- 3 The Toughest Decision: Korea
- THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH RESPONSES
- LESSONS FROM HISTORY
- THE USE OF HISTORICAL ANALOGIES
- RETRIEVAL AND TYPES OF HISTORICAL ANALOGIES
- THE PROCESS OF DRAWING LESSONS FROM HISTORY
- OTHER POSSIBLE HISTORICAL ANALOGIES
- 4 A Twisted Tail: The Iranian Oil Nationalization Crisis
- THE CRISIS AND WESTERN GOALS
- A DIVIDED CABINET: THE BRITISH DECISION NOT TO USE MILITARY FORCE
- BRITISH ALTERNATIVES TO MILITARY FORCE
- U.S. DECISION MAKING
- MOSSADEGH'S RATIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE
- HISTORICAL INFORMATION
- THE PRESENT AND THE PAST
- 5 A Madman Brandishing an Axe: Suez
- WAS NASSER ANOTHER MUSSOLINI?
- WHY DID EDEN RELY ON HISTORY?
- THE EFFECT OF THE 1930s
- FORCE: THE PREFERRED OPTION
- THE TERRIBLE PROBLEM: U.S. OPPOSITION TO THE USE OF FORCE.
- TYPES OF HISTORICAL ANALOGIES
- LESSONS
- 6 Indirect Aggression: Lebanon and Jordan
- THREE CRISES AND AMERICAN AND BRITISH GOALS
- THE MAY DECISION
- WHY MILITARY FORCE?
- THE MAY CRISIS SUBSIDES
- THE JUNE CRISIS
- THE JULY CRISIS
- THE USE OF FORCE
- HISTORICAL ANALOGIES
- CONDITIONS THAT INFLUENCED THE USE OF HISTORICAL ANALOGIES
- PROCESS OF ANALOGICAL REASONING
- 7 Conclusion
- SITUATIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
- CHARACTERISTICS OF HISTORICAL ANALOGIES
- DIAGNOSIS AND PRESCRIPTION OR JUSTIFICATION
- THE PROCESS OF ANALOGICAL REASONING FROM HISTORY
- EFFECT OF HISTORICAL INFORMATION ON DECISION MAKING
- THE 1930s: HITLER'S SHADOW
- HISTORICAL ANALOGIES AND LEARNING
- THE DECISION TO USE MILITARY FORCE
- AREAS OF FURTHER STUDY
- Bibliography
- THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES
- Articles
- Books
- ANALOGICAL REASONING
- KOREA
- Primary Sources
- Secondary Sources
- IRAN
- SUEZ
- PRIMARY SOURCES
- LEBANON/JORDAN
- LEARNING
- Index
- About the Author.
- Notes:
- Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
- Includes bibliographical references (p. [217]-235) and index.
- ISBN:
- 9798216009733
- 9780313001727
- 0313001723
- OCLC:
- 54885910
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