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A new nuclear century : strategic stability and arms control / Stephen J. Cimbala and James Scouras.

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Cimbala, Stephen J.
Contributor:
Scouras, James.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Deterrence (Strategy).
Nuclear arms control.
World politics--1989-.
World politics.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (205 p.)
Edition:
1st ed.
Distribution:
London : Bloomsbury Publishing, 2024
Place of Publication:
Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 2002.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
Cimbala and Scouras examine the issues related to the control of nuclear weapons in the early 21st century. These issues are both technical and policy oriented; science and values are commingled. This means that arguments about nuclear strategy, arms control, and proliferation are apt to be contentious and confusing. The authors seek to provide readers with a fuller, more accurate understanding of the issues involved. They begin by analyzing the crazy mathematics of nuclear arms races and arms control that preoccupied analysts and policymakers during the Cold War. After examining stability modeling, they argue for a more comprehensive definition of strategic stability and they relate this more inclusive concept to the current relationship between the United States and Russia-one characterized by cooperation as well as competition. They then use the concept of friction to analyze how the gap between theory and practice might influence nuclear force operations and arms control. The problem of nuclear weapons spread or proliferation is then considered from the vantage point of both theory and policy. They conclude with an analysis of whether the United States might get by in the 21st century with fewer legs of its strategic nuclear triplet than weapons based on land, at sea, and airborne. A provocative analysis for arms control policymakers, strategists, and students, scholars, and other researchers involved with nuclear weapons issues.
Contents:
Machine generated contents note: Acknowledgments
Introduction
1 First-Strike Stability Modeling: The Crazy Mathematics of
the Cold War
2 Redefining Strategic Stability
3 Friction and Nuclear Deterrence
4 Triad and Tribulation: U.S. and Russian START Options
5 Proliferation in an Unstable World
Conclusion
Further Reading
Index.
Notes:
Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:
9798400691157
9780313012020
0313012024
OCLC:
70750345

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