My Account Log in

3 options

Reopening public facilities after a biological attack : a decision making framework / Committee on Standards and Policies for Decontaminating Public Facilities Affected by Exposure to Harmful Biological Agents: How Clean is Safe?.

Ebook Central Academic Complete Available online

View online

Ebook Central College Complete Available online

View online

National Academies Press Available online

View online
Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Standards and Policies for Decontaminating Public Facilities Affected by Exposure to Harmful Biological Agents: How Clean Is Safe?.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Bioterrorism.
Emergency management--United States.
Emergency management.
Civil defense--United States.
Civil defense.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (224 p.)
Edition:
1st ed.
Place of Publication:
Washington, D.C. : National Academies Press, c2005.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
The anthrax attacks in fall 2001 spurred an extensive and costly decontamination effort where many decisions had to be made about which sites required cleanup, what method to use, how to determine the effectiveness of the cleanup, and how "clean" the building had to be for reoccupation. As part of a project funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and managed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the National Research Council was asked to consider the criteria that must be met for a cleanup to be declared successful, allowing the reoccupation of a facility. The report finds that efficiently sampling and characterizing a pathogen is critical for choosing the best remediation strategy. However, there should be no universal standard for deciding when a building is safe to re-enter because varying pathogen amounts and characteristics could require different strategies. The report offers a flowchart for decision-makers that includes questions about the characteristics of the pathogen; how far it has spread; whether it is transmissible between humans; and how long it will survive to pose a threat. The report also recommends that a risk-assessment approach be adopted as part of a strategy for achieving a "socially acceptable" standard for cleanup.
Contents:
Introduction
2001 attacks and cleanup
Context of the study and charge to the Committee
Content and structure
Infectious disease threats
Ability of microorganisms to infect people
Infectious disease as a weapon
Agents of concern to national security and public health
Biological agents considered in this report
Policy precedents in decontamination
Microbial decontamination in food and water supplies
Biosafety in microbiological and biomedical laboratories
Environmental infection control in health care facilities
Decontamination of U.S. Army Biological Warfare laboratories
Development of Superfund and remediation plans
Remediation experiences in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex
Anthrax decontamination after the 2001 attacks: social and political context
Uncertain science, certain social division
Case study selection
Framework for event management
Hazard identification and assessment
Identification of the agent
Evaluating the state of the agent
Evaluating the state of the contaminated building
Factors influencing exposure to harmful biological agents in indoor environments
Exposure
Sources
Building design and operations
Heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems
Transport and fate of harmful biological agents
Deposition
Resuspension
Preparing and operating buildings for a bioterrorism attack and subsequent operation
Analyzing health risks
Assessment of risks posed by a biological hazard
Dose-response: principles and uncertainties
Sampling strategies and technologies
Sampling and identification
General sampling plan for quantifying the extent of cleanup
Decontamination practices and principles
Processes for decontamination of harmful biological agents and other response options
Decontamination of harmful biological agents by chemical and physical methods
Examples of decontamination: Hart Senate Office Building and American Media International Building
Safe reoccupation of a facility
Planning for biological agent attack
Buildings declared contaminated
Harmful biological agents in a public facility: the airport scenario
Planning can make a major difference
All findings and recommendations
Other relevant case studies
Were the 2001 anthrax exposures consistent with dose-response: the case of the AMI building.
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
ISBN:
9786610742219
9780309165051
0309165059
9781280742217
1280742216
9780309551663
0309551668
OCLC:
70143642

The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.

My Account

Shelf Request an item Bookmarks Fines and fees Settings

Guides

Using the Library Catalog Using Articles+ Library Account