How to defend humane ideals : substitutes for objectivity / James R. Flynn.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Flynn, James R. (James Robert), 1934-2020.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Humanistic ethics.

Social sciences and ethics.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (224 pages)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Lincoln, Neb. : University of Nebraska Press, c2000.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

One of the principal moral and psychological problems of our time is whether humane ideals can be defended. Loss of faith in the objectivity of ethics has encouraged a sense of hopelessness. The notion that no ideal is better than any other, that a humane commitment has no rational advantage over Nietzsche's contempt for ordinary people, has been accused of leaving our civilization without self-confidence or a purpose. James R. Flynn rejects attempts to salvage ethical objectivity as futile and counterproductive. Instead, he uses philosophical analysis to demonstrate the relevance of logic and evidence to moral debate. He then uses modern social science to refute racists, Social Darwinists, Nietzsche, and the meritocracy thesis of "The Bell Curve." Flynn concludes that the great post-Enlightenment project--justice for all races and classes, the reduction of inequality, and the abolition of privilege--retains its moral dignity and relevance.

Contents:

Intro

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

How to Defend Humane Ideals

introduction THE PROBLEM

Truth-Tests and What We Have Lost

part one THE LIMITATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY

Plato and Thrasymachus

Truth-Tests and Proofs

Kant and Sister Simplice

transition AN AGENDA

Morality and Moral Debate

part two THE POTENCY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

Race and Class

Superpeople and Supermen

Justice and Meritocracy

Humanism and Postmodernism

conclusion UNSOLVED PROBLEMS

The Personal and the Conventional

References

Subject Index

Author Index.

Notes:

Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph

Includes bibliographical references (p. [195]-204) and indexes.

ISBN:

0-8032-0261-X

0-585-31135-8

OCLC:

45730640