The lessons and non-lessons of the air and missile campaign in Kosovo / Anthony H. Cordesman.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Cordesman, Anthony H.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Bombing, Aerial--Yugoslavia.

Bombing, Aerial.

Kosovo War, 1998-1999--Aerial operations.

Kosovo War, 1998-1999.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization--Yugoslavia.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xii, 399 pages) : illustrations, maps

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 2001.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

The conclusion of a war typically signals the beginning of a flood of memoirs and instant campaign histories, many presenting the purported, but often dubious lessons of the recent conflict. Cordesman is careful to avoid such pitfalls in this detailed and closely reasoned analysis, and helps us to begin to understand the implications of this dramatic conflict on its own terms. Based on a combination of official and unofficial (but always authoritative) sources, he builds a thorough case for the true lessons of NATO's first battle fought within Europe. After consideration of the historical, major political, and strategic factors that set the stage for the Kosovo campaign, Cordesman critically examines the actual effectiveness of the NATO air campaigns, both in Kosovo and Serbia proper. Operations in this rugged part of Europe were difficult, and compounding the challenges of terrain and weather were the conflicting national agendas within the Allied coalition that seriously hampered focused and decisive action by NATO. Although Milosevic ultimately conceded defeat, all of these factors played an important role in limiting the intensity and shaping the military outcome of the campaign, and the likely political and strategic results were far from certain. Cordesman unflinchingly concludes, that the air campaign over Kosovo exposed deep fault lines within and among the NATO countries and fundamental flaws in the way the West wages war.

Contents:

Cover

The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo

Contents

1 The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo

2 The Historical Background: The Course and Character of the NATO Campaign

BOSNIA AND THE DAYTON ACCORDS BECOME THE PRELUDE TO WAR IN KOSOVO

THE DIPLOMATIC PRELUDE

PEACE TALKS END IN WAR

Serbia's Grand Strategic and Tactical Mistakes

NATO's Blundering into Large-Scale War

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE: THE AIR AND MISSILE CAMPAIGN

The Phases and Non-Phases of the Air and Missile Campaign

The Road to Escalation

Expanding the Target Base and Scale of Military Action

NATO's Changing Objectives

NATO Moves Towards Decisive Force

Ending the Air and Missile Campaign

Why Serbia Conceded

Estimates of the Overall Impact of the Air and Missile Campaign

INCREASES IN NATO FORCES AND LEVELS OF EFFORT

NATO Naval Forces

NATO Aircraft Numbers

Sortie Rates and Intensity

RELIANCE AND NON-RELIANCE ON PRECISION-GUIDED WEAPONS

Analysis by Farce: The Imprecise Nature of Precision Engagement

British and French Use of Precision and Non-Precision Weapons

The Limits of Precision Weapons and Precision Engagement

WEATHER

NATO'S LIMITED LOSSES

CONFLICT TERMINATION

3 The Grand Strategic Aspects of Kosovo: The "Whys" and "Hows" of the War and the Implications for Strategy and Force Planning

THE "WHYS" OF GOING TO WAR

A Lack of Criteria for Deciding on Military Action

The Dilemmas in Deciding on Peacemaking

THE "HOWS" OF GOING TO WAR

COALITION WARFARE AND LEVELS OF COMMITMENT

The Contributions of the US and Europe

Problems in Coalition Warfare: National Decision Making and the Air War

Problems in Coalition Warfare: National Decision Making and the Incident at Pristina

Unity of Command versus Unity of Coalition.

Lessons for the NATO Alliance

US STRATEGY, FORCE PLANNING, AND DEFENSE SPENDING

Major Theater War (MTW) Operation Plans

Problems in US Defense Spending and Readiness

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton

Chief of Staff, US Army, General Dennis J. Reimer

Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay L. Johnson

Commandant of the Marine Corps, Charles C. Krulak

Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Michael E. Ryan

The Force Drawdown Imposed by Kosovo

Being the World's Only Superpower Without Paying for the Power

4 The Strategic Impact and Military Effectiveness of the Air and Missile Campaign

THE SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF THE WAR IN KOSOVO

MORE THAN AIR POWER LED TO NATO'S VICTORY

THE RELEVANCE OF KOSOVO TO OTHER WARS

ROB PETER TO PRAISE PAUL?

STRATEGIC LIMITS ON IMPACT OF AIR POWER IN KOSOVO: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE?

"SHOCK AND AWE" OR "LIMITS AND RESTRAINT"

5 The Problem of "Perfect" and "Bloodless" War

THE ABSURDITY OF PERFECTION

"BLOODLESS WAR": THE PROBLEM OF SUFFERING NO OR MINIMAL CASUALTIES

Casualties and Staying at Medium to High Altitudes

Overall Sensitivity to Casualties

THE PROBLEM OF COLLATERAL DAMAGE

The Chinese Embassy Bombing

The Real-World Problems in Targeting in Wartime

The Results of the US Investigation into the Bombing

The CIA Accepts the Blame

The Imperfect Nature of Perfect War

NATO and Serbian Collateral Damage Claims: Hiding the Truth with a Liar's Contest

The Tragedy of Moral and Analytic Corruption

The Worthless Character of Serbian Claims

Outside Studies and Analyses: The Human Rights Watch and OSCE Reports

Lessons for the Future

Economic Aftermaths and Environmental Effects

THE PROBLEM OF TARGETING

Improvising a New Approach to Targeting

National versus NATO Targeting.

Changes in the Targeting Effort over Time

Precision Targeting, Precision Engagement, and Precision Intelligence

Targeting and C4: "Dynamic Battle Control"

THE NEW CONDITIONS OF WAR

6 NATO Reporting on the Effectiveness of the Air and Missile Campaign

EFFECTIVENESS REPORTING AS OF APRIL 13: THE FIRST THREE WEEKS

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO AIRPOWER FROM DAY 20 TO DAY 24

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AIR AND MISSILE CAMPAIGN: DAY 25 TO DAY 50

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AIR AND MISSILE CAMPAIGN: DAY 50 TO THE END

BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, THE "FOG OF WAR," AND THE "FOG OF SELF-DECEPTION"

The Pentagon Lies to Congress and the American People

The Barry and Thomas Critique of the Pentagon Report

The Fog of War, Surgical Bombing, and the Revolution in Military Affairs

7 Strategic Bombing

THE US POST-ACTION ASSESSMENT OF THE STRATEGIC CAMPAIGN

KOSOVO, NATO, AND STRATEGIC BOMBING

EVOLVING A COMMAND STRUCTURE IN MID-CRISIS

THE ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL BASE THAT NATO ATTACKED

The Vulnerabilities of Serbia's Economy and Infrastructure

Unrealistic NATO Claims versus Unrealistic Serbian Claims

FUEL, PETROLEUM, OIL, AND LUBRICANTS (POL) TARGET GROUPS

Wartime Gamesmanship with Damage Assessment

Guessing at the Impact from a Postwar Perspective

Strikes Against Industry Support and Infrastructure Target Groups

Strikes Against Electric Power Facilities

LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOCs) AND SUPPLY ROUTE TARGET GROUPS

COMMAND AND CONTROL TARGET GROUPS

8 The Air and Missile War and Serbian Air and Land Force Targets

INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM (IADS) TARGET GROUPS

The Yugoslavian Air Force

NATO Attacks on the Serbian Air Force During the Campaign

NATO Claims at the End of the Campaign and Possible Lessons

The Yugoslavian Land-Based Air Defense System.

The Size and Nature of Serbian Forces

NATO's Wartime Claims

Damage Assessments from May to the End of the Conflict

Damage Assessment after the War and the Impact of Serbian Air Defenses in Forcing NATO to Fly at Higher Altitudes

Suppression versus Destruction

The Problem of Survivability

SERBIAN ARMY AND SPECIAL POLICE TARGET GROUPS

The Size and Capability of Serbian Land Forces

NATO Attacks on Serbian Forces and Major Weapons

The Problems of Operational Effectiveness

The Impact of Problems in Reporting on the Strikes on Serbian Land Forces and Battle Damage Assessment

NATO's Damage Claims in Mid-May

NATO's Damage Claims on June 10

Serbia's False Damage Claims and Deception Efforts

NATO's Post-Conflict Damage Assessment Efforts

British Post-Conflict Damage Assessment Claims

US Post-Conflict Damage Assessment Efforts

The Lessons of Attacks on Serbian Ground Forces

THE SERBIAN BUILD-UP, SERBIAN OPERATIONS, AND THE CHALLENGE OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

Serbian and NATO Actions in 1998

The FRY/Serbian Build-Up in 1999

The Serbian Build-Up During the War

Serbian Use of Human Shields and Manipulation of the Media

A Serbian View of the Build-Up

Lessons from the Serbian Build-Up

9 The "Ground Option": The Possible Impact of NATO Planning for an Invasion

THE QUIET SHIFT TOWARDS A GROUND OPTION

PUTTING ALL THE OPTIONS ON THE TABLE

LATE MAY: ON THE EDGE OF GOING TO A GROUND OPTION

10 The "Ground Option": The Role of the KLA

THE REAL-WORLD GROUND OPTION THAT NATO DID NOT DISCUSS

SYNERGY? GUESSING AT THE IMPACT OF AIRPOWER ON THE KLA GROUND OPTION AND VICE VERSA

LESSONS FROM THE KLA GROUND OPTION

11 Detailed Lessons and Issues of the Air and Missile Campaign

AIR SUPERIORITY

THE A-10

THE AH-64

Tactical and Technical Problems.

Readiness and Training Problems and Detailed Technical Issues

Command Problems and Failure to Prepare for Independent Operations

Mobility and Deployability

Politics versus Technical and Tactical Problems

Lessons and Non-Lessons

ASYMMETRIC WEAPONS AND WARFARE

AV-8B HARRIER

BOMBERS: THE B-2, B-1, AND B-52 AND GLOBAL FORCE INTEGRATION

Global Force Integration

Global Attack

Levels of Bomber Action

Uncertain Bomber Effectiveness, Certain Bomber Politics

Claims but No Evidence Regarding the Details of Effectiveness

Lessons or Air Force Propaganda

CLUSTER BOMBS AND MINES

COALITION/NATO TECHNOLOGY AND INTEROPERABILITY

European Problems and Weaknesses

European Views on the Lessons for Force Upgrades and Interoperability

Secretary Cohen's Summary Comments on Interoperability

NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative

NATO and European Action or Inaction?

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTERS (C4)

Key Lessons from the War

Reiterating the Need for Capability and Interoperability

Lessons for High Level and Political Decision Makers

Combined Air Operations Center

Secure Communications and Operational Security

Joint Operational Architecture, Network, and Information Management

CONSCRIPTS VERSUS PROFESSIONALS

WELL-TRAINED RESERVES VERSUS A LARGE MOBILIZATION BASE

CRUISE MISSILES

Speaking in Glittering Generalities

Growing Effectiveness?

DECOYS

ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND THE EA-6B

Over-Reliance on the EA-6B and Insufficient Electronic Warfare Assets

Lessons Regarding the EA-6B

Lessons Regarding the Overall Need to Improve US Electronic Warfare Capabilities

Lessons Regarding NATO and Alliance Electronic Warfare Capabilities

EXPEDITIONARY CAPABILITY AND POWER PROJECTION OF US AND NATO FORCES

Deployment Planning and Management.

The Role of US Strategic Lift.

Notes:

Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph

Includes bibliographical references (p. [378]-399).

ISBN:

9780313073922

0313073929

9780313048746

0313048746

OCLC:

70731843