Stability and justification in Hume's Treatise / Louis E. Loeb.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Loeb, Louis E.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Hume, David, 1711-1776. Treatise of human nature.

Hume, David.

Knowledge, Theory of.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (297 p.)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

New York ; Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2005.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

The philosopher Louis Loeb examines the epistemological framework of Scottish philosopher David Hume, as employed in his celebrated work "A Treatise of Human Nature." Loeb's project is to advance an intergrated interpertation of Hume's accounts of belief and justification. His thesis is that Hume, in his treatise, has a "stability-based" theory of justification which posits that his belief is justified if it is the result of a belief-producing mechanism that engenders stable beliefs. But Loeb argues that the striking (if paradoxical) corollary to this theory is that no belief-generating mechanism is fully stable - or fully justified - for a fully reflective person. This carefully argued and original interpretation of Hume makes sense of seemingly contradictory ideas and should provoke serious discussion among Hume scholars.

Contents:

Intro

Contents

Abbreviations

I. Contexts for Hume's Epistemological Projects

I.1. Hume's Distinction between Calm and Violent Emotions

I.2. The Pyrrhonian Background to Hume's Interest in Stability

I.3. The Motivational Role of Uneasiness

I.4. The Two-Stage Development of Hume's Theory

I.5. The Place of a Stability-Based Interpretation in the Literature

I.6. A Prospectus

II. Causal Inference, Associationism, and the Understanding

II.1. Hume's Commitment to Causal Inference

II.2. Hume's Intended Conclusion in I.iii.6

II.3. Hume's Reconstruction of Reason within a Faculty of Association

III. Integrating Hume's Accounts of Belief and Justification

III.1. A Puzzle in Regard to I.iii

III.2. Steadiness and Infixing in Hume's Theory of Belief

III.3. The Bearing of Hume's Treatment of Education

III.4. The Natural Function of Belief

III.5. Two Versions of the Stability-Based Theory

III.6. A Defense of Attributing the Less Demanding Version to Hume

III.7. Further Remarks on I.iv.7

IV. Unphilosophical Probability and Judgments Arising from Sympathy

IV.1. Degrees of Belief and Justification

IV.2. Instabilities Due to Observation of Accidental Conjunctions

IV.3. Variations in Degree of Confidence Due to Memory and Causal Inference

IV.4. Variations in Sentiment Due to Sympathy

IV.5. Variations Due to Psychological Distance as Sources of Uneasiness

IV.6. Corrections in Judgments of Probability and Moral Judgments

V. The Propensity to Ascribe Identity to Related Objects

V.1. A Pattern of Psychological Explanation in I.iv

V.2. The Operation of the Propensity

V.3. The Propensity and Instability

V.4. The Propensity and Justification

V.5. The Propensity and Meaning

V.6. Tensions in Hume's Account of the Psychological Properties of the Propensity.

VI. Constancy and Coherence in I.iv.2

VI.1. A Puzzle in Regard to Hume's Treatment of Constancy

VI.2. The Dispensability of the Propensity

VI.3. Hume's Satisfaction with the Psychological Adequacy of His Treatment of Coherence

VI.4. An Epistemological Obstacle to Subsuming Constancy under Coherence

VI.5. A Metaphysical Obstacle to Subsuming Constancy under Coherence

VI.6. An Amended Version of I.iv.2

VII. Difficulties-Contrived and Suppressed

VII.1. Hume and Paradox

VII.2. The Manifest Contradiction and Causal Inference

VII.3. The Reduction of Probability "to Nothing

VII.4. The Probability of Causes

VII.5. Contrary Beliefs Based on Habit

VII.6. Contrary Beliefs Not Based Solely on Habit

Bibliography

Index

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

K

L

M

N

O

P

Q

R

S

T

U

V

W.

Notes:

Originally published: 2002.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on metadata supplied by the publisher and other sources.

ISBN:

1-281-19715-7

0-19-803350-8

1-4237-2253-1

OCLC:

70070192