Philosophical relativity / Peter Unger.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Unger, Peter K., author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Relativity.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (x, 132 pages)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2002.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

In this volume Peter Unger questions the objective answers that have been given to traditional problems in philosophy. He casts doubt on the unquestioned view that fundamental questions pertaining to meaning and existence have direct solutions.

Contents:

I. Hypothesis of Philosophical Relativity

1. Problems without Solutions

2. Philosophical Relativity and Semantic Relativity

3. Contextualism and Invariantism

4. Alternative Psychologies

5. Events in Real Time and in Real Brains: Alternative Interpretations

6. Two Levels for Relativity: Words and Objects

7. Indeterminacy of Translation and Holistic Explanation

II. Aspects of Semantic Relativity

1. Contrasting Groups of Expressions

2. Statements, Beliefs, and Truth-values

3. Logic and Meaning

4. Sortalism

5. Extreme Semantic Approaches

6. Relativity and the Rationality of Contextualism

7. Appeal of Invariantism

8. General Sentences, Conversational Interests, and Contexts of Utterance

9. Compatible Vagueness of Semantic and Pragmatic Terms

III. Relativistic Approach to Some Philosophical Problems

1. Problem of Knowledge

2. Problem of Power and of Freedom

3. Problem of Causation

4. Problem of Explanation

5. Categorical Problems and Conditional Problems

IV. On the Status of Ostensible Intuitions

1. Objection from Semantic Intuitions

2. Semantic Intuitions Concerning Problematic Words

3. Objection Reformulated

4. Two Invariantist Replies

5. Direct Relativist Reply

6. How Commonsense Beliefs Account for Appearances of Intuitions: An Explanatory Sketch

V. Two Approaches to Ostensible Intuitions

1. Prevalent Approach to Responses and the Causal Theory of Reference

2. Some Problems for the Causal Theory and for the Prevalent Approach

3. Some Advantages of a Psychological Approach to Examples

4. Perceived Threats to Our System of Beliefs

5. Egocentric Attitudes as Determinants of Response

6. Ostensible Intuitions, Commonsense Beliefs, and Semantic Relativity

VI. 2. Objection from a Particular Language

3. Objection from Overgeneralization

4. Objection from Unnaturalness

5. Prospects for Philosophy.

Notes:

Originally published: Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, c1984.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 121-127) and index.

Description based on metadata supplied by the publisher and other sources.

ISBN:

1-280-50237-1

9786610502370

0-19-803544-6

1-4237-2672-3

OCLC:

191942087