Moral psychology. Volume 4, Free will and moral responsibility / edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, 1955-

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Ethics.

Free will and determinism.

Responsibility.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (493 pages)

Edition:

1st ed.

Other Title:

Free will and moral responsibility

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Massachusetts : The Mit Press, [2014]

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Traditional philosophers approached the issues of free will and moral responsibility through conceptual analysis that seldom incorporated findings from empirical science. In recent decades, however, striking developments in psychology and neuroscience have captured the attention of many moral philosophers. This volume of Moral Psychology offers essays, commentaries, and replies by leading philosophers and scientists who explain and use empirical findings from psychology and neuroscience to illuminate old and new problems regarding free will and moral responsibility. The contributors -- who include such prominent scholars as Patricia Churchland, Daniel Dennett, and Michael Gazzaniga -- consider issues raised by determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism; epiphenomenalism, bypassing, and naturalism; naturalism; and rationality and situationism. These writings show that although science does not settle the issues of free will and moral responsibility, it has enlivened the field by asking novel, profound, and important questions.

Contents:

Intro

Contents

Acknowledgments

Introduction

1 Is Free Will an Illusion? Confronting Challenges from the Modern Mind Sciences

1.1 Free Will Skepticism and Bypassing

1.2 A Neuroscientific Account of the Human Will

1.3 Response to Misirlisoy and Haggard and to Bjornsson and Pereboom

2 Mental Life and Responsibility in Real Time with a Determined Brain

2.1 Seduced by Tradition

2.2 Neuroscience, Explanation, and the Problem of Free Will

2.3 Response

3 Can Neuroscience Resolve Issues about Free Will?

3.1 Free Will, Mechanism, and Determinism: Commentson Roskies, "Can Neuroscience Resolve Issues about Free Will?"

3.2 Comments on Adina Roskies, "Can Neuroscience Resolve Issues about Free Will?"

3.3 Response to Commentators

4 The Neural Code for Intentions in the Human Brain

4.1 Neural Decoding and Human Freedom

4.2 Short-Term and Long-Term Intentions in Psychological Theory, Neurotechnology, and Free Will

4.3 Reply to Schroeder and Bayne

5 Free Will and Substance Dualism

5.1 Dualism, Libertarianism, and Scientific Skepticism about Free Will

5.2 Reconsidering Scientific Threats to Free Will

5.3 Reply to Nadelhoffer and Vargas

6 Constructing a Scientific Theory of Free Will

6.1 Hold Off on the Definitions: Comments on Baumeister

6.2 Free Will Worth Having and the Intentional Control of Behavior

6.3 Grateful Responses to Thoughtful Comments by Holton, Payne, and Cameron

7 The Freedom to Choose and Drug Addiction

7.1 Dopamine Dysfunction and Addict Responsibility

7.2 The Second Hit in Addiction

7.3 Responses to Yaffe and Sripada

8 Agency and Control

8.1 Rules, Rewards, and Responsibility

8.2 Consciousness Matters

8.3 Responses

9 Evolutionary Insights into the Nature of Choice.

9.1 Is Human Free Will Prisoner to Primate, Ape, and Hominin Preferences and Biases?

9.2 Furlong and Santos on Desire and Choice

9.3 Response to Miller and Hare

10 A Social Perspective on Debates about Free Will

10.1 Social Groups

10.2 Social Explanations and the Free Will Problem

10.3 Extreme Group Membership Frames the Debate

References

Contributors

Index.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

"A Bradford book."

OCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.

ISBN:

9780262321495

0262321491

9780262321488

0262321483

OCLC:

872419050