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Aspects of psychologism / Tim Crane.

De Gruyter Harvard University Press Complete eBook-Package 2014-2015 Available online

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EBSCOhost Academic eBook Collection (North America) Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Crane, Tim.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Psychologism.
Phenomenology.
Intentionality (Philosophy).
Physical Description:
1 online resource (384 p.)
Edition:
1st ed.
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 2014.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
Aspects of Psychologism is a penetrating look into fundamental philosophical questions of consciousness, perception, and the experience we have of our mental lives. Psychologism, in Tim Crane's formulation, presents the mind as a single subject-matter to be investigated not only empirically and conceptually but also phenomenologically: through the systematic examination of consciousness and thought from the subject's point of view. How should we think about the mind? Analytical philosophy tends to address this question by examining the language we use to talk about our minds, and thus translates our knowledge of consciousness into knowledge of the concepts which this language embodies. Psychologism rejects this approach. The philosophy of mind, Crane contends, has become too narrow in its purely conceptual focus on the logical and linguistic formulas that structure thought. We cannot assume that the categories needed to understand the mind correspond absolutely with such semantic categories. Crane's claim is that intentionality--the "aboutness" or "directedness" of the mind--is essential to all mental phenomena. He criticizes materialist doctrines about consciousness and defends the position that perception can represent the world in a non-conceptual, non-propositional way, opening up philosophy to a more realistic account of the mind's nature.
Contents:
Introduction : in defence of psychologism
Brentano's concept of intentional inexistence
Wittgenstein on intentionality
The origins of qualia
Intentionality as the mark of the mental
Intentional objects
The intentional structure of consciousness
Intentionalism
The non-conceptual content of experience
Is there a perceptual relation?
Is perception a propositional attitude?
The given
Unconscious belief and conscious thought
Subjective facts
Papineau on phenomenal concepts
Tye on acquaintance and the problem of consciousness.
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Description based on print version record.
ISBN:
9780674728110
0674728114
9780674726581
0674726588
OCLC:
867050097

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