The vulnerability thesis : interest group influence and institutional design / Lorelei K. Moosbrugger.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Moosbrugger, Lorelei K.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Majorities--Case studies.

Majorities.

Pressure groups--Case studies.

Pressure groups.

Representative government and representation--Case studies.

Representative government and representation.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (288 p.)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

New Haven : Yale University Press, c2012.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Where politics is dominated by two large parties, as in the United States, politicians should be relatively immune to the influence of small groups. Yet narrow interest groups often win private benefits against majority preferences and at great public expense. Why? The "vulnerability thesis" is that the electoral system is largely to blame, making politicians in two-party systems more vulnerable to interest group demands than politicians in multiparty systems. Political scientist Lorelei Moosbrugger ranks democracies on a continuum of political vulnerability and tests the thesis by examining agrochemical policy in Austria, Britain, Germany, Sweden, and the European Union.

Contents:

Frontmatter

Contents

Preface

1. Interest Group Influence And Institutional Design

2. The Vulnerability Thesis

3. Evidence From The Environment

4. The European Union

5. The United Kingdom: Minority Influence And Majority Rule

6. Germany: The Politics Of Paying The Polluter

7. Austria: Political Cover And Policy Choice

8. Sweden: Minority Representation And The Majority Interest

9. Institutional Design And The Quality Of Democracy

Notes

Bibliography

Index

Notes:

Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9786613681300

9781280770531

1280770538

9780300167580

030016758X

OCLC:

801411247