Losing small wars : British military failure in Iraq and Afghanstan / Frank Ledwidge.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Ledwidge, Frank.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Iraq War, 2003-2011--Participation, British.

Iraq War, 2003-2011.

Iraq War, 2003-2011--Campaigns--Iraq--Baṣrah.

Afghan War, 2001-2021--Participation, British.

Afghan War, 2001-2021.

Afghan War, 2001-2021--Campaigns--Afghanistan--Helmand River Valley.

Strategic culture--Great Britain.

Strategic culture.

Great Britain--Armed Forces--Management.

Great Britain.

Great Britain--Military policy.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (304 p.)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

New Haven : Yale University Press, c2011.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Partly on the strength of their apparent success in insurgencies such as Malaya and Northern Ireland, the British armed forces have long been perceived as world class, if not world beating. However, their recent performance in Iraq and Afghanistan is widely seen as-at best-disappointing; under British control Basra degenerated into a lawless city riven with internecine violence, while tactical mistakes and strategic incompetence in Helmand Province resulted in heavy civilian and military casualties and a climate of violence and insecurity. In both cases the British were eventually and humiliatingly bailed out by the US army.In this thoughtful and compellingly readable book, Frank Ledwidge examines the British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, asking how and why it went so wrong. With the aid of copious research, interviews with senior officers, and his own personal experiences, he looks in detail at the failures of strategic thinking and culture that led to defeat in Britain's latest "small wars." This is an eye-opening analysis of the causes of military failure, and its enormous costs.

Contents:

Frontmatter

Contents

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Chapter 1: 'Ridiculous Expectations'

Chapter 2: 'Defeated, Pure and Simple'

Chapter 3: 'Where's Helmand?'

Chapter 4: 'A Bleeding Ulcer'

Chapter 5: Dereliction of Duty: The Generals and Strategy

Chapter 6: Cracking On: British Military Culture and Doctrine

Chapter 7: 'Tactics without Strategy?' The Counterinsurgency Conundrum

Chapter 8: Doing No Harm? The Question of Force

Chapter 9: Civvies

Chapter 10: Bad Influences

Chapter 11: Opening Networks

Conclusion

Abbreviations and Acronyms

Notes

Select Bibliography

Index

Notes:

Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph

Includes bibliographical references (p. [270]-298) and index.

ISBN:

1-283-27990-8

9786613279903

0-300-18022-5

OCLC:

769149043