A behavioral theory of elections / Jonathan Bendor ... [et al.].

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Bendor, Jonathan B.

Diermeier, Daniel, Author.

Siegel, David A., Author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Elections.

Voting--Psychological aspects.

Voting.

Behaviorism (Political science).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (264 p.)

Edition:

Course Book

Place of Publication:

Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c2011.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Most theories of elections assume that voters and political actors are fully rational. While these formulations produce many insights, they also generate anomalies--most famously, about turnout. The rise of behavioral economics has posed new challenges to the premise of rationality. This groundbreaking book provides a behavioral theory of elections based on the notion that all actors--politicians as well as voters--are only boundedly rational. The theory posits learning via trial and error: actions that surpass an actor's aspiration level are more likely to be used in the future, while those that fall short are less likely to be tried later. Based on this idea of adaptation, the authors construct formal models of party competition, turnout, and voters' choices of candidates. These models predict substantial turnout levels, voters sorting into parties, and winning parties adopting centrist platforms. In multiparty elections, voters are able to coordinate vote choices on majority-preferred candidates, while all candidates garner significant vote shares. Overall, the behavioral theory and its models produce macroimplications consistent with the data on elections, and they use plausible microassumptions about the cognitive capacities of politicians and voters. A computational model accompanies the book and can be used as a tool for further research.

Contents:

Frontmatter

Contents

Acknowledgments

Chapter One. Bounded Rationality and Elections

Chapter Two. Aspiration-based Adaptive Rules

Chapter Three. Party Competition

Chapter Four. Turnout

Chapter Five. Voter Choice

Chapter Six. An Integrated Model of Two-Party Elections

Chapter Seven. Elections with Multiple Parties

Chapter Eight. Conclusions: Bounded Rationality and Elections

Appendix A. Proofs

Appendix B. The Computational Model

Bibliography

Index

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9786613163745

9781283163743

1283163748

9781400836802

1400836808

OCLC:

741492620