A treatise of Master Hervaeus Natalis (d. 1323), the doctor perspicacissimus, on second intentions.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Hervaeus Natalis, -1323.

Contributor:

Doyle, John P., 1930-

Series:

Mediaeval philosophical texts in translation ; no. 44.

Medieval philosophical texts in translation ; no. 44

Standardized Title:

De secundis intentionibus. English & Latin

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Intentionality (Philosophy)--Early works to 1800.

Intentionality (Philosophy).

Philosophy.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (622 p.)

Edition:

1st ed.

Other Title:

On second intentions

Place of Publication:

Milwaukee, Wis. : Marquette University Press, c2008.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

As almost everyone knows, the notion of intentionality comes from the Middle Ages. What is less known is that Hervaeus Natalis, OP (d. 1323) was the first one explicitly to consider it as such. Even less known is the fact that he came to it not immediately from the Aristotelian De Anima, but rather from the division in Aristotle's Metaphysics between ""being as being"" and ""being as true."" Least of all known is the fact that Hervaeus, who uses the term ""intentionality"" in the present work 235 times, regards its significance as a relation of reason which runs in the direction of known

Contents:

short title HERVAEUS NATALIS ON SECOND INTENTIONS; series title page Mediæval Philosophical Texts in Translation No. 44; title page A TREATISE OF MASTER HERVAEUS NATALIS (d. 1323) THE DOCTOR PERSPICACISSIMUS ON SECOND INTENTIONS; copyright page; Table of Contents; dedication To Mary Gale With Thanks and Love; Acknowledgements; Introduction; Volume 1 A TREATISE ON SECOND INTENTIONS (English Translation); The First Question [Asks about First Intentions, and It Has Five Articles.] With Regard to the First [Question] Five Things Are Asked

[Article I] [Whether an Intelligible Species Is a First Intention.][Article II] [Whether a First Intention Is Nothing More than an Act of Understanding.]; [Article II] [Whether a First Intention Is a Thing Taken Universally or Particularly.]; [Article IV] [Whether Privations Come within the Scope of First Intentions.]; [Article V] [Whether Figments Belong under (pertineant ad) First Intentions.]; The Second Question. [About Second Intentions with Regard to their Entity and It Has Six Articles.]; [Article I] [Whether a Second Intention Is the Act Itself of Understanding]

[Article II] [Whether a Second Intention Is Something Real Which Exists in the Intellect as in a Subject.][Article II] [Whether a Second Intention Is Some Real Positive Thing Which Exists in the Nature of Things.]; [Article IV] [Whether a Second Intention Is Only a Relation [Relatio] of Reason.]; [Article V] [Whether a Second Intention Is a Relation (Relatio) of an Understood Thing to an Intellect.]; [Article VI] [Whether a Second Intention Is Only (sola) a Relation (Relatio) of an Understood Thing to the Intellect]

The Third Question. [Asks about the Relation (habitudo) of Second to First Intention with respect to its Foundation, and It Has Four Articles.][Article I] [Whether Any Second Intention Is Founded upon a Thing outside [the mind]; [Article II] [Whether Some Second Intention Is Immediately Founded upon a Thing outside [the Mind]; [Article II] [Whether a Second Intention May Be Founded upon a First]; [Article IV] [Whether One Second Intention May Be Founded upon Another.]

The Fourth Question. [The Fourth Question Asks about the Relation (habitudo) or the Comparison of a Second to a First Intention with regard to Predication. And It Contains Three Articles.][Article I] [Whether a Second Intention can with Truth be predicated of a Thing outside [the mind], for example:in saying "man is a species," and the like.]; [Article II] [Whether One Second Intention Can with Truth Be Predicated of Another, by Saying, for Example, "A Genus Is a Species."]

[Article II.] [Whether One Second Intention Can Be Predicated of the Foundation of an Opposite Intention, So That This [Proposition] Is True, When We Say "Man Is a Genus," as well as Similar [Proposit

Notes:

Includes translation into English by John P. Doyle.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

0-87462-835-0

OCLC:

655532063