Democratic authority : a philosophical framework / David M. Estlund.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Estlund, David M.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Authority.

Democracy--Philosophy.

Democracy.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (324 p.)

Edition:

Course Book

Place of Publication:

Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c2008.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Democracy is not naturally plausible. Why turn such important matters over to masses of people who have no expertise? Many theories of democracy answer by appealing to the intrinsic value of democratic procedure, leaving aside whether it makes good decisions. In Democratic Authority, David Estlund offers a groundbreaking alternative based on the idea that democratic authority and legitimacy must depend partly on democracy's tendency to make good decisions. Just as with verdicts in jury trials, Estlund argues, the authority and legitimacy of a political decision does not depend on the particular decision being good or correct. But the "epistemic value" of the procedure--the degree to which it can generally be accepted as tending toward a good decision--is nevertheless crucial. Yet if good decisions were all that mattered, one might wonder why those who know best shouldn't simply rule. Estlund's theory--which he calls "epistemic proceduralism"--avoids epistocracy, or the rule of those who know. He argues that while some few people probably do know best, this can be used in political justification only if their expertise is acceptable from all reasonable points of view. If we seek the best epistemic arrangement in this respect, it will be recognizably democratic--with laws and policies actually authorized by the people subject to them.

Contents:

Frontmatter

Contents

Preface

CHAPTER I. Democratic Authority

CHAPTER II. Truth and Despotism

CHAPTER III. An Acceptability Requirement

CHAPTER IV. The Limits of Fair Procedure

CHAPTER V. The Flight from Substance

CHAPTER VI. Epistemic Proceduralism

CHAPTER VII. Authority and Normative Consent

CHAPTER VIII. Original Authority and the Democracy/Jury Analogy

CHAPTER IX. How Would Democracy Know?

CHAPTER X. The Real Speech Situation

CHAPTER XI. Why Not an Epistocracy of the Educated?

CHAPTER XII. The Irrelevance of the Jury Theorem

CHAPTER XIII. Rejecting the Democracy/Contractualism Analogy

CHAPTER XIV. Utopophobia: Concession and Aspiration in Democratic Theory

Notes

Bibliography

Index

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9786612935794

9786612463273

9781282463271

1282463276

9781282935792

1282935798

9781400831548

1400831547

OCLC:

638860571