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When insurers go bust : an economic analysis of the role and design of prudential regulation / Guillaume Plantin, Jean-Charles Rochet.

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Plantin, Guillaume.
Contributor:
Rochet, Jean-Charles.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Insurance--State supervision.
Insurance.
Insurance law--Economic aspects.
Insurance law.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (112 p.)
Edition:
Course Book
Place of Publication:
Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2007.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
In the 1990's, large insurance companies failed in virtually every major market, prompting a fierce and ongoing debate about how to better protect policyholders. Drawing lessons from the failures of four insurance companies, When Insurers Go Bust dramatically advances this debate by arguing that the current approach to insurance regulation should be replaced with mechanisms that replicate the governance of non-financial firms. Rather than immediately addressing the minutiae of supervision, Guillaume Plantin and Jean-Charles Rochet first identify a fundamental economic rationale for supervising the solvency of insurance companies: policyholders are the "bankers" of insurance companies. But because policyholders are too dispersed to effectively monitor insurers, it might be efficient to delegate monitoring to an institution--a prudential authority. Applying recent developments in corporate finance theory and the economic theory of organizations, the authors describe in practical terms how such authorities could be created and given the incentives to behave exactly like bankers behave toward borrowers, as "tough" claimholders.
Contents:
Four recent cases of financially distressed insurers
The state of the art in prudential regulation
Inversion of the production cycle and capital structure of insurance companies
Absence of a tough claimholder in the financial structure of insurance companies and incomplete contracts
How to organize the regulation of insurance companies
The role of reinsurance
How does insurance regulation fit within other financial regulations?
Conclusion : Prudential regulation as a substitute for corporate governance.
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references (p. [99]-101).
ISBN:
9786612129735
9781282129733
1282129732
9781400827770
1400827779
OCLC:
342572503

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