Regulation and public interests : the possibility of good regulatory government / Steven P. Croley.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Croley, Steven P., 1965-

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Administrative law--Economic aspects.

Administrative law.

Social choice.

Trade regulation.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (391 p.)

Edition:

Course Book

Place of Publication:

Princeton : Princeton University Press, c2008.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Not since the 1960's have U.S. politicians, Republican or Democrat, campaigned on platforms defending big government, much less the use of regulation to help solve social ills. And since the late 1970's, "deregulation" has become perhaps the most ubiquitous political catchword of all. This book takes on the critics of government regulation. Providing the first major alternative to conventional arguments grounded in public choice theory, it demonstrates that regulatory government can, and on important occasions does, advance general interests. Unlike previous accounts, Regulation and Public Interests takes agencies' decision-making rules rather than legislative incentives as a central determinant of regulatory outcomes. Drawing from both political science and law, Steven Croley argues that such rules, together with agencies' larger decision-making environments, enhance agency autonomy. Agency personnel inclined to undertake regulatory initiatives that generate large but diffuse benefits (while imposing smaller but more concentrated costs) can use decision-making rules to develop socially beneficial regulations even over the objections of Congress and influential interest groups. This book thus provides a qualified defense of regulatory government. Its illustrative case studies include the development of tobacco rulemaking by the Food and Drug Administration, ozone and particulate matter rules by the Environmental Protection Agency, the Forest Service's "roadless" policy for national forests, and regulatory initiatives by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Trade Commission.

Contents:

Front matter

Contents

Acknowledgments

Introduction. An Uneasy Commitment to Regulatory Government

PART I. THE CYNICAL VIEW OF REGULATORY GOVERNMENT, AND ITS ALTERNATIVES

Chapter One. The Basic Project

Chapter Two. The Cynical View of Regulation

Chapter Three. Is Regulatory Capture Inevitable?

Chapter Four. Alternative Visions of Regulatory Government

PART II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATORY STATE

INTRODUCTION TO PART 2

Chapter Five. Opening the Black Box: Regulatory Decision making in Legal Context

Chapter Six. Regulatory Government as Administrative Government

Chapter Seven. Participation in Administrative Decision making

Chapter Eight. The Administrative-Process Approach Expanded: A More Developed Picture

PART III. PUBLIC INTERESTED REGULATION

INTRODUCTION TO PART 3

Chapter Nine. The Environmental Protection Agency's Ozone and Particulate Matter Rules

Chapter Ten. The Food and Drug Administration's Tobacco Initiative

Chapter Eleven. The Forest Service's Roadless Policy for National Forests

Chapter Twelve. Socially Beneficial Administrative Decision making: Additional Evidence

PART IV. PUBLIC CHOICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

INTRODUCTION TO PART 4

Chapter Thirteen. The Public Choice Theory Revisited

Chapter Fourteen. The Promise of an Administrative-Process Orientation

Chapter Fifteen. Regulatory Rents, Regulatory Failures, and Other Objections

Conclusion. The Regulatory State and Social Welfare

Notes

Index

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9786612086731

9781282086739

1282086731

9781400828142

1400828147

OCLC:

368358168