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We all lost the Cold War / Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein.

De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook Package Archive 1927-1999 Available online

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EBSCOhost Academic eBook Collection (North America) Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Lebow, Richard Ned.
Contributor:
Stein, Janice Gross.
Series:
Princeton studies in international history and politics.
Princeton studies in international history and politics
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Cold War.
Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962.
Arab-Israeli conflict.
Arab-Israeli conflict--1973-1993.
Nuclear weapons.
Nuclear warfare.
United States--Foreign relations--Soviet Union.
United States.
Soviet Union--Foreign relations--United States.
Soviet Union.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (557 p.)
Edition:
Course Book
Place of Publication:
Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c1994.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
Drawing on recently declassified documents and extensive interviews with Soviet and American policy-makers, among them several important figures speaking for public record for the first time, Ned Lebow and Janice Stein cast new light on the effect of nuclear threats in two of the tensest moments of the Cold War: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the confrontations arising out of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. They conclude that the strategy of deterrence prolonged rather than ended the conflict between the superpowers.
Contents:
Front matter
CONTENTS
PREFACE
ABBREVIATIONS
CHAPTER ONE Introduction
PART ONE: THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962
CHAPTER TWO. Missiles to Cuba: Foreign-Policy Motives
CHAPTER THREE. Missiles to Cuba: Domestic Politics
CHAPTER FOUR. Why Did Khrushchev Miscalculate?
CHAPTER FIVE. Why Did the Missiles Provoke a Crisis?
CHAPTER SIX. The Crisis and Its Resolution
PART TWO: THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, OCTOBER 1973
CHAPTER SEVEN. The Failure to Prevent War, October 1973
CHAPTER EIGHT. The Failure to Limit the War: The Soviet and American Airlifts
CHAPTER NINE. The Failure to Stop the Fighting
CHAPTER TEN. The Failure to Avoid Confrontation
CHAPTER ELEVEN. The Crisis and Its Resolution
PART THREE: DETERRENCE, COMPELLENCE, AND THE COLD WAR
CHAPTER TWELVE. How Crises Are Resolved
CHAPTER THIRTEEN. Deterrence and Crisis Management
CHAPTER FOURTEEN. Nuclear Threats and Nuclear Weapons
POSTSCRIPT: Deterrence and the End of the Cold War
NOTES
APPENDIX
NAME INDEX
GENERAL INDEX
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliograhical references (p. [377]-521) and indexes.
ISBN:
9786612751820
9781400804818
1400804817
9781400804801
1400804809
9781400812493
1400812496
9781282751828
1282751824
9781400821082
1400821088
OCLC:
700688345

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