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The bounds of agency : an essay in revisionary metaphysics / Carol Rovane.

De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook Package Archive 1927-1999 Available online

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EBSCOhost Academic eBook Collection (North America) Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Rovane, Carol A. (Carol Anne), 1955-
Series:
Princeton Legacy Library ; 5567
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Agent (Philosophy).
Self (Philosophy).
Subject (Philosophy).
Physical Description:
1 online resource (271 p.)
Edition:
Course Book
Place of Publication:
Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c1998.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
The subject of personal identity is one of the most central and most contested and exciting in philosophy. Ever since Locke, psychological and bodily criteria have vied with one another in conflicting accounts of personal identity. Carol Rovane argues that, as things stand, the debate is unresolvable since both sides hold coherent positions that our common sense will embrace. Our very common sense, she maintains, is conflicted; so any resolution to the debate is bound to be revisionary. She boldly offers such a revisionary theory of personal identity by first inquiring into the nature of persons.Rovane begins with a premise about the distinctive ethical nature of persons to which all substantive ethical doctrines, ranging from Kantian to egoist, can subscribe. From this starting point, she derives two startling metaphysical possibilities: there could be group persons composed of many human beings and multiple persons within a single human being. Her conclusion supports Locke's distinction between persons and human beings, but on altogether new grounds. These grounds lie in her radically normative analysis of the condition of personal identity, as the condition in which a certain normative commitment arises, namely, the commitment to achieve overall rational unity within a rational point of view. It is by virtue of this normative commitment that individual agents can engage one another specifically as persons, and possess the distinctive ethical status of persons.
Contents:
Front matter
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
PART I: LESSONS FROMLOCKE Introduction to Part I
Introduction to Part I
CHAPTER ONE. Preview of the Normative Analysis of Personal Identity
CHAPTER TWO. On the Need for Revision
CHAPTER THREE. A Revisionary Proposal
PART II: PERSONAL IDENTITY: THE BODY PRACTIC
Introduction to Part II
CHAPTER FOUR. A Sufficient Condition for Personal Identity
CHAPTER FIVE. The Sufficient Condition Is Also Necessary
CHAPTER SIX. The First Person
POSTSCRIPT
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references (p. [251]-254) and index.
ISBN:
1-4008-0688-7
0-691-19888-8
1-282-75333-9
9786612753336
1-4008-2242-4
1-4008-1323-9
OCLC:
707068795

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