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Nuclear arms control : background and issues / Committee on International Security and Arms Control National Academy of Sciences.
- Format:
- Book
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Arms control.
- Nuclear arms control--Soviet Union.
- Nuclear arms control.
- Nuclear arms control--United States.
- Nuclear nonproliferation.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (390 p.)
- Edition:
- 1st ed.
- Place of Publication:
- Washington, D.C. : National Academy Press, 1985.
- Language Note:
- English
- Summary:
- This nontechnical overview of developments in nuclear arms control describes how the United States and the Soviet Union arrived at their present positions--and where they might go from here. According to Foreign Affairs , "This book is proof that the complexities of arms control can be successfully explained in a nontechnical, and even more importantly, nonpartisan manner. . . . It presents the key issues in a clear, thorough, and remarkably up-to-date way. . . . Strongly recommended as a primary source for classroom and public discussions."
- Contents:
- Nuclear Arms Control
- Copyright
- Contents
- Foreword
- Preface
- 1 Overview
- ARMS CONTROL AS A PROCESS
- THE OBJECTIVES OF ARMS CONTROL
- APPROACHES TO ARMS CONTROL
- Limits
- Freezes
- Restructuring
- Reductions
- Bans
- Special Stabilizing Measures
- THE U.S.-SOVIET STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP
- OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS
- VERIFICATION
- RECORD OF COMPLIANCE
- POLITICAL OR MILITARY "LINKAGE
- THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS
- DOMESTIC POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY
- SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
- 2 Strategic Offensive Nuclear Arms Control
- PART I THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (SALT)
- Introduction
- Background
- The Origins
- SALT I Negotiations
- The SALT II Negotiations
- The Provisions of Salt I and Salt II
- The SALT I Interim Agreement
- The SALT II Treaty
- The Main Issues Surrounding Salt II
- The Strategic Relationship
- SALT II Supporters
- SALT II Critics
- The Rationale for SALT II: Preserving Essential Equivalence
- Verification
- Compliance
- Compliance with SALT I from 1972 to 1979
- Compliance with SALT I and SALT II from 1980 to 1984
- PART II THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START)
- Initial START Proposals
- The Scowcroft Commission and Build-Down
- The Revised U.S. START Proposal
- The U.S. START Proposal Incorporating Build-Down
- U.S. and Soviet Start Proposals
- The U.S. START Proposal as of December 1983
- The Soviet START Proposal as of December 1983
- The Main Issues Surrounding Start
- START Supporters' Assessment of the Strategic Relationship
- START Critics' Assessment of the Strategic Relationship
- The Soviet View of the Strategic Relationship
- The Rationale for START: Selective Deep Cuts to Restore Stability
- START Supporters' Approach.
- Domestic Criticisms of START
- The Soviet Approach to START
- 3 The Nuclear Freeze
- INTRODUCTION
- BACKGROUND
- The Congress and Freeze Resolutions
- DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR FREEZE PROPOSAL
- THE MAIN ISSUES SURROUNDING THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR FREEZE
- The Strategic Relationship: Equivalence Versus Inferiority
- Supporters of the Comprehensive Freeze
- Critics of the Comprehensive Freeze
- Rationale: Freeze at Parity to Stop the Arms Race
- Verification of a Comprehensive Nuclear Freeze
- The Soviet Union and the Nuclear Freeze
- 4 The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Negotiations
- NATO's Dual-Track Deployment Decision
- The INF Negotiations
- The "Walk in the Woods" Formula
- The Soviet Offer to Match British and French Missiles
- The U.S. Interim Agreement Proposal
- The "Walk in the Park" Proposal
- SUMMARY OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET INF POSITIONS AS OF NOVEMBER 1983
- THE MAIN ISSUES SURROUNDING THE INF NEGOTIATIONS
- The European Nuclear Balance: Different U.S. and Soviet Perspectives
- The U.S. View
- The Soviet View
- The Main Differences Between the U.S. and Soviet INF Proposals
- The U.S. Approach
- The Soviet Approach
- The Deployment and the Future of NATO
- Integrating the START and INF Negotiations
- 5 Strategic Defensive Arms Control: The SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
- The Johnson Years
- The Nixon Years: ABM and SALT
- The Strategic Defense Initiative
- PROVISIONS OF THE SALT I ABM TREATY
- THE MAIN ISSUES SURROUNDING THE SALT I ABM TREATY
- Reopening the ABM Debate.
- Supporters of the Strategic Defense Initiative
- Critics of the Strategic Defense Initiative
- Verification and Compliance
- 6 Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Arms Control
- The Origin of the ASAT Program
- The Ford-Carter Years
- The Reagan Years
- SUMMARY OF U.S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON ASAT ARMS CONTROL
- The U.S. Position
- The Soviet Position
- THE MAIN ISSUES SURROUNDING ANTI-SATELLITE ARMS CONTROL
- U.S. Supporters of ASAT Arms Control
- 7 Nuclear Test Bans
- The Eisenhower Administration
- The Kennedy Administration
- The Nixon and Ford Administrations
- The Carter Administration
- The Reagan Administration
- THE MAIN ISSUES SURROUNDING A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN
- Overall U.S. Security
- Importance of Testing to U.S. Security
- Reliability of Stockpiled Weapons
- Development of New Weapons
- Nuclear Effects
- Safety
- Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
- The Weapons Laboratories
- General
- Threshold of Detection and Identification
- Hiding in Earthquakes
- Nonseismic Information
- On-Site Inspection
- Significance of Testing Below the Threshold
- Significance of Very Low Yield Tests
- Impact on Nuclear Proliferation
- 8 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
- THE NATURE OF THE RISK
- The Relationship of Proliferation to U.S. and International Security and Stability
- The Technical Problem
- Capabilities Versus Intentions
- THE HISTORY OF NON-PROLIFERATION
- NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICY
- Denial Versus Constructive Engagement
- Uniform Versus Discriminatory Policies
- Relationship to NPT Obligations
- Extreme Denial
- THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION AGREEMENTS
- The Non-Proliferation Treaty
- The Treaty of Tlatelolco and Other Possibilities for Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones.
- Agreements Limiting Nuclear Testing
- The Physical Security Convention and Related Measures
- THE ADEQUACY AND SUFFICIENCY OF INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
- Essential Characteristics
- Technical Considerations
- Timely Warning
- Coverage
- Adequacy of Safeguards Agreements
- Inspection Rights
- Implementation of Existing Safeguards
- HOLDOUTS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME
- The Countries of Greatest Near-Term Concern
- The Problem of Coordination with Other Concerned Countries
- Acronyms
- Appendix A Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain...
- INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON CERTAIN MEASURES...
- Article I
- Article II
- Article III
- Article IV
- Article V
- Article VI
- Article VII
- Article VIII
- PROTOCOL TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON...
- AGREED STATEMENTS, COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS, AND UNILATERAL STATEMENTS REGARDING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED...
- 1. Agreed Statements
- 2. Common Understandings
- A. Increase in ICBM Silo Dimensions
- B. Standing Consultative Commission
- C. Standstill
- 3. Unilateral Statements
- A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty
- B. Land-Mobile ICBM Launchers
- C. Covered Facilities
- D. "Heavy" ICBM's
- Appendix B Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of...
- TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC...
- For the United States of America
- For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
- Article V
- Article IX
- Article X
- Article XI
- Article XII
- Article XIII
- Article XIV
- Article XV
- Article XVI
- Article XVII
- Article XVIII
- Article XIX
- PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION...
- MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS REGARDING THE...
- STATEMENT OF DATA ON THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS OF THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY
- JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND BASIC GUIDELINES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS
- SOVIET BACKFIRE STATEMENT
- Appendix C Treaty Between The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of...
- TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC…
- AGREED STATEMENTS, COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS, AND UNILATERAL STATEMENTS REGARDING THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF...
- A. Location of ICBM Defenses
- B. ABM Test Ranges
- C. Mobile ABM Systems
- D. Standing Consultative Commission
- E. Standstill
- B. Tested in ABM Mode
- C. No-Transfer Article of ABM Treaty
- D. No Increase in Defense of Early Warning Radars.
- PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION.
- Notes:
- Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
- ISBN:
- 9786610222216
- 9781280222214
- 1280222212
- 9780309554602
- 0309554608
- 9780585085128
- 0585085129
- OCLC:
- 427404716
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