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Moral judgments as educated intuitions / Hanno Sauer.

Van Pelt Library BJ1408.5 .S38 2017
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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Sauer, Hanno, author.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Judgment (Ethics).
Ethics--Psychological aspects.
Ethics.
Emotions.
Ethical intuitionism.
Physical Description:
xiii, 312 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, Massachusetts : The MIT Press, [2017]
Contents:
I The Anti-Rationalist Challenge 21
1 The Effectiveness of Moral Reasoning 25
Introduction 25
1 The Effectiveness Thesis 26
2 The Conscious-Reasoning Paradigm 28
3 Running Out of Reasons 29
4 The No Reasons Interpretation 32
5 Moral Reasoning as Confabulation 34
6 Moral Reasoning from an Intuitionist Perspective 36
7 Placebic Reasons 39
8 Moral Principles: Universal Moral Grammar or Confabulation? 41
9 Moral Choice Blindness 43
10 The Social Structure of Moral Reasoning 45
11 The Causality Requirement 47
Conclusion 48
2 Educated Intuitions 51
Introduction 51
1 The Automaticity Challenge 53
2 Habits and Practical Reason 57
3 Intellectualism and the Reasons Theory 61
4 Reason, Habits, and Second Nature 63
5 From Post Hoc Reasoning to Confabulation 65
6 Rational Habits: The Goal-Dependency of Education 66
7 Varieties of Post Hoc Reasoning 67
8 Moral Education: Experience and Teaching 70
9 Ex Ante Education 74
10 Ex Post Education 76
11 Reason and Its Limits 82
Conclusion 83
3 Moral Reasoning as a Social Practice 85
Introduction 85
1 Moral Intuitions and the Structure of Moral Justification 87
2 Structural Contextualism 90
3 Moral Justification and Moral Education 94
4 Confabulation or Inarticulateness? 95
5 From Challenges to Responses 100
6 From Responses to Challenges 102
7 The Flexibility of the Space of Reasons 105
8 Giving and Asking for Reasons 107
9 Moral Justification from an Empirical Perspective 115
Conclusion 126
II The Emotionist Challenge 129
4 Moral Error 139
Introduction 139
1 What Is Emotionism? 141
2 The Infallibility Problem 145
3 Recalcitrant and Flimsy Feelings 147
4 The Wrong Kind of Mistake 150
5 Substantive Moral Mistakes 160
Conclusion 163
5 Are Emotions Necessary for Moral Judgment? 165
Introduction 165
1 The Necessity Thesis: Psychopathy and the Moral/Conventional Distinction 168
2 Perceptual Characteristics of Emotions 173
3 Morality and Emotion: The Limits of Empathy 181
4 Is Reason Necessary for Moral Judgment? 185
Conclusion 191
6 Are Emotions Sufficient for Moral Judgment? 193
Introduction 193
1 The Sufficiency Thesis: Morality and Disgust 194
2 Justificatory Sufficiency 197
3 Moral Judgment and Reasons Responsiveness 200
4 Conceptual Constraints 210
5 What Reflection Can (and Cannot) Do 212
6 A (Limited) Role for Disgust? 217
Conclusion 219
III Applying the Model 223
7 Educated Deontological Intuitions 227
Introduction 227
1 Moral Dilemmas and Moral Intuitions 227
2 "From Neural 'Is' to Moral 'Ought'" 230
3 Functional Neuroimaging and the Problem of Reverse Inference 231
4 Response Time and Cognitive Load 234
5 Brain Lesions and the Dual Process Model 237
6 Up Close and Personal? From the Personal/Impersonal Distinction to the Concept of "Personal Force" 239
7 Intuitive and Counterintuitive Moral Judgment 245
8 Educated Deontological Intuitions 247
Conclusion 255.
Notes:
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
ISBN:
9780262035606
026203560X
OCLC:
957339476
Publisher Number:
99971604925

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