Modal justification via theories / Bob Fischer.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Fischer, Bob (Robert William), author.

Series:

Synthese library ; v. 380.

Synthese Library ; volume 380

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Philosophy.

Knowledge, Theory of.

Metaphysics.

Philosophy and science.

Physical Description:

x, 135 pages ; 25 cm.

Place of Publication:

Cham, Switzerland : Springer International Publishing, [2017]

Summary:

"This monograph articulates and defends a theory-based epistemology of modality (TEM). According to TEM, someone justifiably believe an interesting modal claim if and only if (a) she justifiably believes a theory according to which that claim is true, (b) she believes that claim on the basis of that theory, and (c) she has no defeaters for her belief in that claim. The book has two parts. In the first, the author motivates TEM, sets out the view in detail, and defends it against a number of objections. In the second, the author considers whether TEM is worth accepting. To argue that it is, the author sets out criteria for choosing between modal epistemologies, concluding that TEM has a number of important virtues. However, the author also concedes that TEM is cautious: it probably implies that we are not justified in believing some interesting modal claims that we might take ourselves to be justified in believing. This raises a question about TEM's relationship to Peter van Inwagen's modal skepticism, which the author explores in detail. As it turns out, TEM offers a better route to modal skepticism than the one that van Inwagen provides. But rather than being a liability, the author argues that this is a further advantage of the view. Moreover, he argues that other popular modal epistemologies do not fare better: they cannot easily secure more extensive modal justification than TEM. The book concludes by clarifying TEM's relationship to the other modal epistemologies on offer, contending that TEM need not be a rival to those views, but can instead be a supplement to them."--Page 4 of cover.

Contents:

A theory-based epistemology of modality

Some assumptions

TEM : a sketch

A modal epistemology for games

The game analogy

Looking ahead

TEM's details

Theories and their modal content

Interlude : the syntactic view revisited

The basing condition

Can TEM be extended?

Conclusion

Objections and clarifications

physical theories don't say anything about what's metaphysically necessary

If TEM is true, we can't justifiably believe physical theories

The circularity worry

TEM and metaphysical methodology

Idealization and partial justification

The problem of false theories

The modal collapse objection

The conflict objection

The logic objection

A false start

The ambitious option

A posteriori necessities

Semantic indeterminacy

Summing up

Theory selection

How should we choose?

IBE

The virtues

Conservatism

Simplicity

Disagreement

Belief or acceptance?

IBE and TEM

TEM and modal skepticism

Van Inwagen's argument

Problems for the disjunctive argument

The "direct evidence" version of modal skepticism

An alternative proposal

Benefits of the alternative

Some cases

The problem of evil

The ontological argument

Against optimism

Yablo

Imagining without images

Imagining with images

The modal-knowno problem

Chalmers

Williamson

TEM and the theoretical virtues

References.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 131-135).

ISBN:

3319491261

9783319491264

OCLC:

960492835