A naïve realist theory of colour / Keith Allen.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Allen, Keith, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Color (Philosophy).

Physical Description:

x, 204 pages ; 24 cm

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford ; New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2016.

Summary:

A Naive Realist Theory of Colour' defends the view that colours are mind-independent properties of things in the environment, that are distinct from properties identified by the physical sciences. This view stands in contrast to the long-standing and wide-spread view amongst philosophers and scientists that colours don't really exist - or at any rate, that if they do exist, then they are radically different from the way that they appear. It is argued that 'a naive realist theory of colour' best explains how colours appear to perceiving subjects, and that this view is not undermined either by reflecting on variations in colour perception between perceivers and across perceptual conditions, or by our modern scientific understanding of the world. 'A Naive Realist Theory of Colour' also illustrates how our understanding of what colours are has far-reaching implications for wider questions about the nature of perceptual experience, the relationship between mind and world, the problem of consciousness, the apparent tension between common sense and scientific representations of the world, and even the very nature and possibility of philosophical inquiry.

Contents:

1 Introduction: Naïve Realist Theories of Colour 1

1.1 What Are Colours? 1

1.2 Naïve Realism: An Overview 3

1.3 Naïve Realism: A Selective History 6

1.4 Naïve Realism and Theories of Perception 10

1.5 Overview 14

2 Mind-Independence 16

2.1 The Argument from Colour Constancy 16

2.2 Colour Constancy and Dispositionalism 21

2.3 Is Colour Constancy Perceptual? 28

2.4 The Exclusion Problem 32

2.5 Constancy and Perception 42

2.6 Conclusion: The Argument from Colour Constancy 45

3 Perceptual Variation 48

3.1 The Argument from Perceptual Variation 48

3.2 Intra-Personal Variation 50

3.3 Inter-Personal Variation 58

3.4 Inter-Species Variation 65

4 Distinctness 74

4.1 Colours as Distinct Properties 74

4.2 The Modal Argument for Distinctness 76

4.3 Are Colour Terms Rigid Designators? 83

4.4 Colours as Observational Properties 85

4.5 Conclusion: The Modal Argument for Distinctness 90

5 Causation 93

5.1 The Causal Exclusion Argument 93

5.2 Do We Ordinarily Believe that Colours Cause Colour Experiences? 96

5.3 Causal Compatibilism 101

5.4 Causation or Causal Explanation? 104

5.5 A Bizarre Pre-Established Harmony? 106

5.6 Coda: Beyond Experience? 110

6 Structural Properties of the Colours 114

6.1 The Argument from Structure 114

6.2 Are the Structural Properties Essential Properties of the Colours? 116

6.3 Are the Structural Properties Instantiated by Physical Properties? 118

6.4 Naïve Realism and the Structural Properties of the Colours 128

6.5 Conclusion: The Case for Distinctness 130

7 Revelation 131

7.1 Revelation 131

7.2 Mind-Independence 133

7.3 Causation 138

7.4 Structural Properties of the Colours 141

7.5 Distinctness 146

7.6 Knowing Which 150

7.7 Acquaintance 153

8 Realism 155

8.1 Quietism 155

8.2 Are External Questions Intelligible? 156

8.3 Are External Questions Compulsory? 163

8.4 Are External Questions Answerable? 166

8.5 The Reality of Colour 170

9 Conclusion: Consciousness and the Manifest image 176

9.1 The Galilean Intuition and the Problem of Consciousness 176

9.2 The Manifest and Scientific Images 183.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

0198755368

9780198755364

OCLC:

968183992