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Game theory in action : an introduction to classical and evolutionary models / Stephen Schecter, Herbert Gintis.

LIBRA QA269 .S365 2016
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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Schecter, Stephen (Professor of mathematics), author.
Gintis, Herbert, author.
Contributor:
John Lammey Stewart Memorial Library Fund.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Game theory.
Physical Description:
xii, 274 pages : illustrations ; 26 cm
Place of Publication:
Princeton ; Oxford : Princeton University Press, [2016]
Summary:
Game Theory in Action is a textbook about using game theory across a range of real-life scenarios. From traffic accidents to the sex lives of lizards, Stephen Schecter and Herbert Gintis show students how game theory can be applied in diverse areas including animal behavior, political science, and economics. The book's examples and problems look at such fascinating topics as crime-control strategies, climate-change negotiations, and the power of the Oracle at Delphi. The text includes a substantial treatment of evolutionary game theory, where strategies are not chosen through rational analysis, but emerge by virtue of being successful. This is the side of game theory that is most relevant to biology; it also helps to explain how human societies evolve. Aimed at students who have studied basic calculus and some differential equations, Game Theory in Action is the perfect way to learn the concepts and practical tools of game theory. Aimed at students who have studied calculus and some differential equations, Examples are drawn from diverse scenarios, ranging from traffic accidents to the sex lives of lizards, A substantial treatment of evolutionary game theory, Useful problem sets at the end of each chapter Book jacket.
Contents:
Chapter 1. Backward induction
Chapter 2. Eliminating dominated strategies
Chapter 3. Nash equilibria
Chapter 4. Games in extensive form with incomplete information
Chapter 5. Mixed strategy Nash equilibria
Chapter 6. More about games in extensive form with complete information
Chapter 7. Symmetries of games
Chapter 8. Alternatives to the Nash equilibrium
Chapter 9. Differential equations
Chapter 10. Evolutionary dynamics.
Notes:
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Local Notes:
Acquired for the Penn Libraries with assistance from the John Lammey Stewart Memorial Library Fund.
ISBN:
9780691167657
0691167656
9780691167640
0691167648
9781400880881
1400880882
OCLC:
919479400
Publisher Number:
99970620332

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