Why adjudicate? : enforcing trade rules in the WTO / Christina L. Davis.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Davis, Christina L., 1971-

Contributor:

ebrary, Inc.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

World Trade Organization.

Foreign trade regulation.

Administrative procedure.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xvi, 326 pages) : illustrations

Place of Publication:

Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 2012.

System Details:

text file

Summary:

The World Trade Organization (WTO) oversees the negotiation and enforcement of formal rules governing international traded. Why do countries choose to adjudicate their trade disputes in the WTO rather than settling their, differences on their own? In Why Adjudicate? Christina Davis investigates the domestic politics behind the filing of WTO complaints and reveals why formal dispute settlement creates better outcomes for governments and their citizens.

Davis demonstrates that industry lob bying, legislative demands, and international politics influence which countries and cases appear before the WTO. Democratic checks and balances bias the trade policy process toward public lawsuits and away from informal settlements. Trade officials use legal complaints to manage domestic politics and defend trade interests. WTO dispute settlement enables states and domestic groups to signal resolve more effectively, thereby enhancing the information available to policymakers and reducing the risk of a trade wan Davis establishes her argument with data on trade disputes and landmark cases, including the Boeing Airbus controversy over aircraft subsidies, disagreement over, Chinese intellectual property rights, and Japan's repeated challenges of U.S. steel industry protection. In her analysis of foreign trade barriers against U.S. exports, Davis explains why the United States gains better outcomes for cases 'taken to formal dispute: settlement than for those negotiated. Case studies of Peru and Vietnam show that legal action can also benefit developing countries. Book jacket.

Contents:

1 Introduction 1

The Enforcement of International Trade Law 6

Overview 20

2 Domestic Constraints and Active Enforcement 26

Trade Institutions and Liberalization 29

Political Origins of Demand for Trade Enforcement 39

Hypotheses for Trade Strategies 57

Conclusion 60

3 The Democratic Propensity for Adjudication 62

Why Are Democracies Litigious? 66

Data 72

Democratic Challengers 80

Democratic Defendants 88

Alliances and Dyadic Dispute Patterns 92

Conclusion 100

4 The Litigious State: U.S. Trade Policy 102

U.S. Role as Enforcer of Multilateral Trade Rules 104

Legislative Constraints in U.S. Trade Policy 111

The Kodak-Fuji Film Dispute 118

Foreign Trade Barrier Dataset 123

Statistical Analysis of U.S. Forum Choice 132

Boeing-Airbus Dispute 138

The China Problem 158

Conclusion 182

5 The Reluctant Litigant: Japanese Trade Policy 185

Defending Market Access for Japanese Exports 187

Delegation in Japanese Trade Policy 195

Statistical Analysis of Japanese Forum Choice 210

Active Adjudication Targeting U.S. Steel Protection 225

Other Solutions for China 233

Conclusion 241

6 Conflict Management: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Adjudication 244

Solving Hard Cases 246

Analysis of Progress to Remove Barrier 248

Analysis of Trade Dispute Duration 253

Conclusion 256

7 Level Playing Field? Adjudication by Developing Countries 258

Peru Challenges European Food Labeling 262

Vietnam and the Catfish Dispute 267

Conclusion 279

8 Conclusion 281

The Political Role of Adjudication 281

Conflict and Cooperation 293

Toward a Broader Theory of Legalization 297.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Electronic reproduction. Palo Alto, Calif. : ebrary, 2011. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ebrary affiliated libraries.

OCLC:

782925047

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license.