A cooperative species : human reciprocity and its evolution / Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Bowles, Samuel, author.

Contributor:

Gintis, Herbert.

ebrary, Inc.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Cooperation.

Cooperativeness.

Behavior evolution.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xii, 262 pages) : illustrations

Place of Publication:

Princeton : Princeton University Press, [2011]

System Details:

text file

Contents:

Chapter 1 A Cooperative Species 1

Chapter 2 The Evolution of Altruism in Humans 8

2.1 Preferences, Beliefs, and Constraints 9

2.2 Social Preferences and Social Dilemmas 10

2.3 Genes, Culture, Groups, and Institutions 13

2.4 Preview 18

Chapter 3 Social Preferences 19

3.1 Strong Reciprocity Is Common 20

3.2 Free-Riders Undermine Cooperation 22

3.3 Altruistic Punishment Sustains Cooperation 24

3.4 Effective Punishment Depends on Legitimacy 26

3.5 Purely Symbolic Punishment Is Effective 29

3.6 People Punish Those Who Hurt Others 31

3.7 Social Preferences Are Not Irrational 32

3.8 Culture and InstitutionsMatter 33

3.9 Behavior Is Conditioned on Group Membership 35

3.10 People Enjoy Cooperating and Punishing Free-Riders 38

3.11 Social Preferences in Laboratory and Natural Settings 39

3.12 Competing Explanations 42

Chapter 4 The Sociobiology of Human Cooperation 46

4.1 Inclusive Fitness and Human Cooperation 48

4.2 Modeling Multi-level Selection 52

4.3 EquilibriumSelection 57

4.4 Reciprocal Altruism 59

4.5 Reciprocal Altruism in Large Groups 63

4.6 Reputation: Indirect Reciprocity 68

4.7 Altruism as a Signal of Quality 71

4.8 Positive Assortment 72

4.9 Mechanisms and Motives 75

Chapter 5 Cooperative Homo economicus 79

5.1 Folk Theorems and Evolutionary Dynamics 80

5.2 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 83

5.3 The Folk Theorem with Private Information 86

5.4 Evolutionarily Irrelevant Equilibria 87

5.5 Social Norms and Correlated Equilibria 89

5.6 The Missing Choreographer 90

Chapter 6 Ancestral Human Society 93

6.1 Cosmopolitan Ancestors 95

6.2 Genetic Evidence 99

6.3 PrehistoricWarfare 102

6.4 The Foundations of Social Order 106

6.5 The Crucible of Cooperation 110

Chapter 7 The Coevolution of Institutions and Behaviors 111

7.1 Selective Extinction 115

7.2 Reproductive Leveling 117

7.3 Genetic Differentiation between Groups 120

7.4 Deme Extinction and the Evolution of Altruism 121

7.5 The Australian Laboratory 123

7.6 The Coevolution of Institutions and Altruism 124

7.7 Simulating Gene-Culture Coevolution 126

7.8 Levelers and Warriors 130

Chapter 8 Parochialism, Altruism, andWar 133

8.1 Parochial Altruism and War 135

8.2 The Emergence of Parochial Altruism and War 138

8.3 Simulated and Experimental Parochial Altruism 142

8.4 The Legacy of a Past "Red in Tooth and Claw" 146

Chapter 9 The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity 148

9.1 Coordinated Punishment 150

9.2 Altruistic Punishment in a Realistic Demography 156

9.3 The Emergence of Strong Reciprocity 159

9.4 Why Coordinated Punishment Succeeds 163

9.5 A Decentralized Social Order 164

Chapter 10 Socialization 167

10.1 Cultural Transmission 168

10.2 Socialization and the Survival of Fitness-Reducing Norms 171

10.3 Genes, Culture, and the Internalization of Norms 173

10.4 The Internalized Norm as Hitchhiker 176

10.5 The Gene-Culture Coevolution of a Fitness-Reducing Norm 179

10.6 How Can Internalized Norms Be Altruistic? 180

10.7 The Programmable Brain 183

11 Social Emotions 186

11.1 Reciprocity, Shame, and Punishment 188

11.2 The Evolution of Social Emotions 191

11.3 The "Great Captains of Our Lives" 192

12 Conclusion: Human Cooperation and Its Evolution 195

12.1 The Origins of Human Cooperation 196

12.2 The Future of Cooperation 199.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

Electronic reproduction. Palo Alto, Calif. : ebrary, 2011. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ebrary affiliated libraries.

OCLC:

729378027

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license.