Hard lessons : the Iraq reconstruction experience.

Format:

Book

Government document

Contributor:

United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Postwar reconstruction--Iraq.

Postwar reconstruction.

Waste in government spending.

Fraud.

Iraq.

Iraq War, 2003-2011.

Fraud--United States.

United States.

Fraud--Iraq.

Waste in government spending--United States.

Waste in government spending--Iraq.

Guerra de Irak, 2003--Consecuencias.

Reconstrucción posbélica--Irak.

Estados Unidos--Relaciones--Irak.

Irak--Relaciones--Estados Unidos.

Local Subjects:

Guerra de Irak, 2003--Consecuencias.

Reconstrucción posbélica--Irak.

Estados Unidos--Relaciones--Irak.

Irak--Relaciones--Estados Unidos.

Physical Description:

xix, 456 pages : illustrations, map ; 28 cm

Place of Publication:

Washington, DC : Special Inspector General, Iraq Reconstruction : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., [2009?]

Summary:

From the Publisher: The billions of dollars expended in Iraq constitute the largest relief and reconstruction exercise in American history. SIGIR's lessons learned capping report characterizes this effort in four phases (pre-war to ORHA, CPA, post-CPA/Negroponte era, and Khalilzad, Crocker, and the Surge). From this history, SIGIR forwards a series of conclusions and recommendations for Congress to consider when organizing for the next post-conflict reconstruction situation. Over the past five years, the United States has provided nearly fifty billion dollars for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. This unprecedented rebuilding program, implemented after the March 2003 invasion, was developed to restore Iraq's essential services, build Iraq's security forces, create a market-based economy, and establish a democratic government-all in pursuit of U.S. interests in a stable and free Iraq. Did the U.S. rebuilding program achieve its objectives? Was the money provided well-spent or wasted? What lessons have we learned from the experience? Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, a report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), answers these and other important questions by presenting a comprehensive history of the U.S. program, chiefly derived from SIGIR's body of extensive oversight work in Iraq, hundreds of interviews with key figures involved with the reconstruction program, and thousands of documents evidencing the reconstruction work that was-or was not-done. The report examines the limited pre-war planning for reconstruction, the shift from a large infrastructure program to a more community-based one, and the success of the "Surge" in 2007 and beyond. Hard Lessons concludes that the U.S. government did not have the structure or resources in place to execute the mammoth relief and reconstruction plan it took on in 2003. The lessons learned from this experience create a basis for reviewing and reforming the U.S. approach to contingency relief and reconstruction operations.

Contents:

Part 1: Planning To Rebuild Iraq

1: Planning begins

2: Agencies engage

3: Department of Defense takes charge

4: Staging in Kuwait

5: ORHA in Baghdad

Part 2: Coalition Provisional Authority Leads Reconstruction

6: Charting a new course

7: CPA's shortfalls

8: Treasury's triage

9: Bremer's grand vision

10: Contracting billions for reconstruction

11: Restoring Iraq's capacity to govern

12: Reconstructing Iraqi security forces

13: Restarting oil production

14: Rebuilding the electricity sector

15: Iraq reconstruction in transition

Part 3: U S Embassy Takes Charge

16: Negroponte's revisions

17: Contingency contracting and program management

18: Building in a war zone

19: Iraqi security forces and counterinsurgency

20: Elections, rule of law, and fighting corruption

21: Investigating fraud

Part 4: Overcoming Roadblocks To Reconstruction

22: Khalilzad's adaptations

23: Returning to the provinces

24: Primacy of capacity development

25: Reconstruction amid sectarian violence

26: Civilian surge

Part 5: Lessons Learned

27: Hard lessons

28: Afterword: Reforming Contingency Relief And Reconstruction Operations

Annexes

1: Genesis and methodology of Hard Lessons

2: Oversight of reconstruction programs and expenditures.

Notes:

A chronological history submitted by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 359-456).

Other Format:

Hard lessons

Online version: Hard lessons.

ISBN:

9780160808173

0160808170

OCLC:

302189848