With, without, or against the state? : how European regions play the Brussels game / Michaël Tatham.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Tatham, Michaël, 1981- author.

Series:

Transformations in governance

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Regionalism--European Union countries.

Regionalism.

European Union countries.

European Union countries--Politics and government.

Politics and government.

Comparative government.

Physical Description:

xvii, 314 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm.

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2016.

Summary:

Much research has highlighted that sub-state entities (SSEs)-such as the German Länder, the Spanish autonomous communities, or the French regions-mobilize at the European level. This literature, however, is silent on how this sub-state activity interacts with that of its own member state. Do SSEs lobby in Brussels with their member state (cooperation), without their member state (non-interaction), or against their member state (conflict)? This book fills the current research gap by identifying what the pattern of interaction between state and sub-state EU interest representation corresponds to, and by identifying what the determinants of such a pattern are. To achieve this, both quantitative and qualitative methods are employed. The quantitative section consists of regression analyses on data collected through a survey addressed to heads of regional offices in Brussels, and highlights that cooperation is the most frequent outcome, followed by non-interaction. Conflicting interest representation is the least frequent outcome. Further analysis reveals that devolution levels do not affect conflict but increase the frequency of cooperation and decrease that of non-interaction. Meanwhile, party political incongruence fails to affect conflict, decreases cooperation, and increases non-interaction. This quantitative work is complemented by a series of in-depth case study analyses of Scotland (UK), Salzburg (Austria), Rhône-Alpes, and Alsace (both France). Based on over a hundred semi-structured interviews, the case studies, along with additional statistical testing, confirm the overall findings reached through quantitative means and further suggest that the effect of devolution overrides that of party political incongruence. Book jacket.

Contents:

1 Regions and the Brussels Game 1

1.1 Empirical Puzzle 3

1.2 Theoretical Puzzle 4

1.3 Contextualization-The 'Third Level', Europeanization, and 'Multi-level Governance' Literatures 7

2 Research Question, Hypotheses, and Theoretical Framework 15

2.1 Dependent Variable and Definitions 15

2.2 Hypotheses 19

2.3 Theoretical Framework 27

2.4 Methodological Challenges 40

3 Paradiplomacy with Adjectives? Revisiting Sub-state Interest Representation in Brussels 47

3.1 Six Types of Hypotheses on Brussels Paradiplomacy 48

3.2 Variable Qperationalization and Data 57

3.3 Results 65

3.4 Discussion 90

3.5 Conclusions 106

4 Qualitative Design and Data 110

4.1 Variable Operationalization 110

4.2 A Quasi-experimental Design Applied to the UK 112

4.3 Comparative Statics 117

4.4 Qualitative Interview Data 122

5 The UK Laboratory 124

5.1 Experiment I: Applying the Devolution Treatment 124

5.2 Experiment II: Applying the Party Politics Treatment 146

5.3 Overall Conclusions of the UK Quasi-experiments 166

6 France, Alsace, and Rhône-Alpes 168

6.1 Data 169

6.2 Mostly Non-interaction, Little Conflict, and Little Cooperation 170

6.3 Conclusions 192

7 Austria and Salzburg 196

7.1 Data 197

7.2 Complete Cooperation at Home Hence Little Coordination Abroad 197

7.3 Conclusions from the Salzburg and Austria Case Study 226

8 State and Sub-state Interest Representation; Results from a Mixed Methods Approach 229

8.1 Triangulation, Hypotheses Assessment, and Refinement 230

8.2 Devolution Overrides All 238

8.3 Regional Mobilization and the Myth of Conflict 251

8.4 Comparative Research and the Myth of 'Exceptionalism' 259

8.5 Differentiation and Variation: Towards More Nuanced Findings 262

9 Playing the Game: Implications, Validity, and Limits 267

9.1 Summary of Key Findings 267

9.2 Policy and Theoretical Implications 270

9.3 Generalization: External Validity and Limits 272

9.4 Future Avenues of Research 278.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 283-304) and index.

ISBN:

9780198758624

0198758626

OCLC:

962303727