Nuclear security : better oversight needed to ensure that security improvements at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory are fully implemented and sustained : report to congressional committees.

Format:

Book

Government document

Author/Creator:

United States. Government Accountability Office.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory--Security measures.

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

Security systems.

United States. National Nuclear Security Administration--Security measures.

United States.

United States. National Nuclear Security Administration.

Nuclear facilities--Security measures--United States.

Nuclear facilities.

Nuclear facilities--Security measures.

Nuclear energy--Research--Laboratories--Security measures--United States.

Nuclear energy.

Nuclear energy--Research--Laboratories.

National security--United States.

National security.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (ii, 36 pages, digital, PDF file)

Other Title:

Better oversight needed to ensure that security improvements at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory are fully implemented and sustained

Physical security at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Place of Publication:

[Washington, D.C.] : U.S. Govt. Accountability Office, [2009]

System Details:

text file

Summary:

Energy's (DOE) security inspection at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) found significant weaknesses, particularly in LLNL's protective force's ability to assure the protection of weapons-grade (special) nuclear material. LLNL is overseen by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE, and managed by a contractor.NNSA is planning to remove most of the special nuclear material from LLNL. GAO was asked to (1) characterize security deficiencies identified in the 2008 inspection; (2) determine the factors that contributed to these deficiencies; (3) identify LLNL's corrective actions to address security deficiencies; and (4) assess LLNL's plan to permanently remove the riskiest special nuclear material from its site. To conduct this work, GAO visited LLNL, reviewed numerous documents and plans, and interviewed LLNL and NNSA security officials. GAO recommends that the Administrator of NNSA improve and sustain federal oversight of security at LLNL by (1) developing a detailed plan and budget for training NNSA's Livermore Site Office (LSO) security staff and (2) providing financial incentives to LLNL's contractor to sustain security improvements.

Notes:

Record is based on bibliographic data in ProQuest U.S. Congressional Research Digital Collection. Reuse except for individual research requires license from ProQuest, LLC.

Includes bibliographical references.

Electronic reproduction. [Bethesda, Md.] : ProQuest, 2004. digital, PDF file. ProQuest U.S. Congressional Research Digital Collection. Mode of access: World Wide Web via ProQuest website.

Other Format:

Print version: United States. Government Accountability Office. Nuclear security

Microfiche version: United States. Government Accountability Office. Nuclear security. CIS 2009 J942-292

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license.